Become a Member for $9.99/month

Although Vietnamese citizens often dismiss their own domestic elections as largely symbolic, Việt Nam is remarkably proactive in sending delegations to “monitor elections” abroad when invited.

In late December 2025, for example, Myanmar’s military government invited Việt Nam to observe its election . [1] International media widely described the vote, organized by the coup-installed military authorities, as a “ sham election. ”

In contrast, following the observation mission, domestic Vietnamese media repeatedly quoted statements describing it as a “ successful general election. ” [2] [3]

A year earlier, Việt Nam dispatched a similar delegation to “monitor elections” in Russia. While the outcome remained predictably unchanged from previous years, the Vietnamese side assessed that “the organization of the election was well conducted, voters were facilitated in casting their ballots, and security was ensured.” [4]

Strikingly, many Vietnamese citizens are well aware that domestic election outcomes are largely predetermined, much like the elections in Myanmar and Russia. The key difference is that, unlike those two nations, Việt Nam has never invited any foreign country or organization to monitor its own electoral process.

This contrast highlights several important and intriguing characteristics of elections in Việt Nam.

What is Election Monitoring?

Transparent elections are a necessary condition for any democracy. In a democratic system, conducting elections fairly and in accordance with established rules is a fundamental prerequisite.

Election monitoring , or election observation, is the act of overseeing an electoral process to ensure it complies with domestic laws and international electoral standards. [5]

To guarantee fairness, this task is typically carried out by an independent third party—whether a domestic entity or an international body—that is not directly involved in organizing the election.

Such oversight comes from various sources, including foreign governments, professional international organizations like ANFREL , non-governmental organizations, independent media, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens. [6] In multi-party systems, opposition parties may even monitor one another.

While monitoring can sometimes be limited to election day itself—such as how Việt Nam observes foreign elections—it is more commonly a continuous process. In order to ensure the consistent upholding of fundamental principles, true oversight evaluates the entire electoral cycle, from the period before the election to the aftermath.

Within this field, some organizations, such as the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE Project), draw a clear distinction between “monitoring” and “observation.” [7]

While both involve examining, recording, reporting, and evaluating the electoral process, monitoring carries a degree of authority to intervene. Consequently, the ACE Project observes that domestic oversight bodies, such as national election management authorities, typically conduct monitoring.

Despite this technical distinction, many election-monitoring organizations treat the two terms interchangeably, uniformly adopting a strict principle of “ non-interference ” during their operations. [8]

The Paradox of Self-Monitoring

In Việt Nam, certain “paradoxes” exist and are accepted as entirely normal, ranging from a “socialist-oriented market economy” to the concept of “abusing democratic freedoms.” This rule also applies to the concept of election monitoring.

According to the Law on Elections , the responsibility for overseeing elections falls to three distinct entities: the Việt Nam Fatherland Front, the National Election Council, and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. [9]

The notable issue is that all three bodies also play central roles in organizing the very elections they are supposed to oversee. In essence, they monitor their own work.

The Standing Committee of the National Assembly is tasked with “allocating the number of deputies to be elected” and “determining the structure and composition of nominated candidates.”

At the same time, the National Election Council acts as the core body for “organizing elections” and “directing and guiding electoral work” across all levels.

Finally, the Việt Nam Fatherland Front oversees the crucial consultation process that “selects and nominates candidates.” Việt Nam lacks an independent election monitoring organization, and establishing one has never been seriously considered.

Despite operating within the country, international non-governmental organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) strictly limit their roles.

They conduct surveys and studies, such as the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index ( PAPI ), to offer recommendations for improvement. [10] Although these studies assess public participation during election years, the activities are purely advisory and do not constitute actual election monitoring.

Why True Reform Remains Distant

Many Vietnamese readers are already familiar with the concept of “playing the game while also acting as referee,” as it is a long-standing characteristic of the country’s political system. Similarly, international observers who study elections in Việt Nam often find it difficult to regard the process as substantive.

Leading political scholar Bùi Hải Thiêm offers a different perspective in his research on election integrity and reform in Việt Nam. [11]

Thiêm argues that the Vietnamese government genuinely seeks to improve election integrity—aiming for honesty, transparency, and fairness—and has actively made efforts toward this goal in recent terms. While many Western scholars view Vietnamese elections as merely symbolic, he contends that electoral integrity is a key component of the government’s broader objective to build a “socialist law-based state.”

From this perspective, the legitimacy of the state and the Communist Party depends not only on economic performance but also on “legal-rational” legitimacy. Improving election integrity generates internal legitimacy and fosters external recognition by aligning the country with international electoral standards.

In other words, Việt Nam possesses its own internal incentives to enhance electoral integrity, even without relying on international monitoring mechanisms or civil society oversight.

Thiêm, on the other hand, says that these plans haven't led to any real changes yet. The inherent nature of a one-party political system and the rigorous consultation process create significant barriers for independent candidates, who are essential for fair elections.

Furthermore, the complete absence of an independent monitoring mechanism is a critical flaw. Viet Nam has never subjected voting to independent oversight since the 1946 election, instead relying on state-controlled media. The current tightening of press freedom severely restricts the capacity of the media and civil society to monitor elections.

Thiêm argues that achieving genuine election integrity will be exceedingly difficult without meaningful “self-restraint” of power by the Communist Party. As such, the establishment of an independent national election monitoring body remains a distant prospect.

Nevertheless, if the government truly wishes to improve election integrity to strengthen its legitimacy, it must open space for critical voices and permit civil mechanisms to exercise oversight. Only when elections are conducted transparently, fairly, and competitively will the true legitimacy of both the government and its elected officials naturally emerge and be reinforced.

Sa Huỳnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 15, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Reed, A. (2026, January 20). Việt Nam’s Vested Interest in Myanmar’s Sham Election . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/viet-nams-vested-interest-in-myanmars-sham-election/

2. Ratcliffe, R. (2026, January 2). ‘We are always living in fear’: inside Myanmar’s ‘sham’ election. The Guardian . https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/02/inside-myanmar-sham-election

3. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2026, January 26). Myanmar tổ chức thành công tổng tuyển cử: Lợi thế thuộc về Đảng USDP. baochinhphu.vn . https://baochinhphu.vn/myanmar-to-chuc-thanh-cong-tong-tuyen-cu-loi-the-thuoc-ve-dang-usdp-102260126140755243.htm

4. Vov, B. Đ. T. (2024, March 17). Quan sát viên quốc tế đánh giá cao công tác tổ chức bầu cử Tổng thống Nga. VOV.VN . https://vov.vn/the-gioi/quan-sat-vien-quoc-te-danh-gia-cao-cong-tac-to-chuc-bau-cu-tong-thong-nga-post1083271.vov

5. User, G. (2021, October 9). ABC về bầu cử — Viện ISEE . Viện iSEE. https://www.isee.org.vn/thu-vien/c8zk30ydi7y5ngxc99maqtpg3817r6-sc8bf?rq=b%E1%BA%A7u%20c%E1%BB%AD

6. ENEMO . (n.d.). https://enemo.org/post/enemo-handbook-for-election-observation-367

7. Observation, monitoring or supervision — . (n.d.). https://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/election-observation/observation-monitoring-or-supervision

8. The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers . (n.d.). International IDEA. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/declaration-principles-international-election-observation-and-code-conduct

9. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2026, February 23). Luật Bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội và đại biểu Hội đồng nhân dân 2015. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-Bau-cu-dai-bieu-Quoc-hoi-va-dai-bieu-Hoi-dong-nhan-dan-2015-282376.aspx

10. Vietnam, U. (n.d.). Giới thiệu về PAPI . PAPI: Chỉ Số Hiệu Quả Quản Trị Và Hành Chính Công Cấp Tỉnh Ở Việt Nam. https://papi.org.vn/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/gioi-thieu-ve-papi.html

11. Thiem H. Bui (2018): Dilemmas in the Construction of a Socialist Law-based State in Vietnam: Electoral Integrity and Reform, Asian Studies Review, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2018.1451490