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Just as Hà Nội completed a reshuffle of its political apparatus, Beijing was already waiting with 32 agreements ready for signature. The state visit of General Secretary and President Tô Lâm to China from April 14 to 17 concluded with this striking figure of signed documents. [1]

The very next morning, the entire state-run media system simultaneously reported the outcome in triumphant tones: “great success,” “a new milestone,” and “a new height.”

However, when studying this trip, one issue stands out: not the sheer number of documents, but their level of transparency.

The Strategy Behind the Schedule

Relations between Việt Nam and China have long operated in an informational gray zone, where joint statements are published but the detailed contents of specific agreements rarely reach the public.

This is not a new phenomenon; for years, informal “secret agreements” have existed as commitments that the public cannot access, the National Assembly cannot fully supervise, and the press leaves unquestioned.

The core issue is not the existence of sensitive agreements, as that is standard in diplomacy. Rather, the concern is identifying the line between reasonable diplomatic secrecy and a systemic lack of transparency . This visit does not clarify that boundary, but it further deepens the problem.

It is highly reflective of the policy priorities of Hà Nội when a leader who has just assumed office and stabilized his domestic position flies to Beijing to sign 32 large-scale cooperation documents before even completing internal policy frameworks. The journey was clearly not merely a ceremonial trip.

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung confirmed that Việt Nam “always values and gives top priority to developing relations with China, considering it an objective requirement and a strategic choice.” [2]

The specific use of the phrase “objective requirement” is noteworthy because it implies inevitability. Yet, in diplomacy, nothing is truly inevitable; there are only decisions made within specific power structures and contexts.

32 Vague Agreements

The two sides signed 32 documents that cover areas ranging from party, police, and judicial cooperation to trade, infrastructure, and technology. [3] However, what stands out most is their presentation. They are uniformly grouped under the general label of “cooperation documents,” and with the exception of the joint statement, almost none have been published in full.

Fundamental information also remains entirely unclear. It is unknown how many of these documents are legally binding, whether any are international treaties requiring National Assembly ratification, or what the memoranda of understanding (MOUs) actually contain.

From a legal and technical perspective, it is necessary to distinguish between three types of documents with vastly different legal implications that have been improperly grouped together. These include directional cooperation plans, non-binding memoranda of understanding that set frameworks for action, and more binding protocols that act as simplified international treaties.

State media reporting failed to make these distinctions. Instead, all were broadly labeled as “cooperation documents” and tallied together to produce the impressive figure of 32. This creates a sense of scale that functions far more as a political signal than as transparent legal information.

Tracking Dependency in Railway Infrastructure

Among the signed documents is a “certificate of handover of results for the project on preparing the feasibility study report for the Lào Cai – Hà Nội – Hải Phòng railway line,” indicating that China funded the feasibility study and has formally handed the results over to Việt Nam. [4]

This gesture goes beyond mere technical assistance and likely represents a deliberate strategy in infrastructure investment relations. In large-scale infrastructure projects, the nation that funds the feasibility study typically dictates the technical standards, system design, and the eventual selection of future suppliers.

Accompanying this handover is an MOU on cooperation in railway human resource training. By training personnel according to Chinese technical standards, a workforce is created that is inextricably linked to that specific technological ecosystem, thereby making any future transition to alternative systems significantly more difficult.

These agreements appear to be early steps in cementing standards and technological ecosystems. Notably, there remains a complete lack of public information regarding the attached financial conditions, the mechanisms for future contractor selection, or the ultimate degree of technological dependency involved.

This lack of detailed disclosure is a common mechanism major powers utilize to secure long-term influence over strategic infrastructure projects; explicit contractual clauses become unnecessary when influence is already embedded into the very operation of the system.

The Most Sensitive and Least Transparent Field

Among the signed documents is an MOU on cooperation in digital technology . [5] Although the MOU is arguably the most concerning document, it has received the least media attention.

Cooperation with China in this sector could encompass data sharing, technical protocol standardization, telecommunications infrastructure deployment, and artificial intelligence systems, yet no information has been disclosed regarding the specific scope of the agreement.

At a time when China is actively advancing its “Digital Silk Road” strategy to export digital infrastructure, surveillance models, and data governance systems globally, the execution of such an agreement without public disclosure raises significant concerns regarding digital sovereignty.

Nations such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and several African countries have learned costly lessons in this regard: when a foreign partner constructs domestic digital infrastructure, the host nation receives embedded conditions alongside the physical assets.

These conditions often only become visible years later and are exceedingly difficult to reverse. Consequently, this non-transparent MOU represents a critical information gap.

Political Language and Unexplained Commitments

The Việt Nam–China joint statement heavily utilizes politically loaded terms, such as "community with a shared future,” and emphasizes the leadership roles of the two parties.

These terms are not merely symbolic, as they possess the power to shape long-term interpretations of bilateral relations. Despite these terms, there is no official explanation regarding their specific scope or their legal and political implications.

The more abstract the diplomatic language becomes, the greater the need for public clarification—yet the opposite is occurring.

The Unasked Questions

Transparency is not merely about disclosure; it is equally about allowing questions to be asked. Currently, many fundamental inquiries are entirely absent from public discourse.

No media outlet has asked under what conditions this cooperation takes place or who holds the right to know those conditions.

Furthermore, no one has raised the issue of dispute resolution mechanisms within the newly signed agreements, nor has anyone questioned whether these documents will alleviate or worsen the significant trade deficit that Việt Nam runs with China.

Most notably, there is complete silence regarding the East Sea (the South China Sea), where China continues to exercise de facto control over areas in direct contravention of the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Strikingly, not a single one of the 32 signed documents addresses these maritime issues or the fishing rights of Vietnamese fishermen.

The absence of these important questions shows that a much deeper issue exists: the space for discussing Việt Nam–China relations remains significantly constrained.

Within this context, transparency is no longer just an idealistic choice; it is a necessary condition to assess risks and benefits, assign accountability, and ensure that international commitments genuinely serve the public interest.

While friendly relations are certainly necessary, the concept of “friendship” between the two countries cannot be used to justify avoiding the real and existing geopolitical issues.

Filling the Gap

There is currently not enough information to conclude whether these signed documents benefit or disadvantage Việt Nam. However, one thing is clear: the public lacks sufficient information to evaluate them because most of the 32 documents remain undisclosed.

The core issue has shifted from the specific content of the agreements to the fundamental habit of transparency toward citizens.

While some people may argue that certain information must remain confidential for national interests, this argument is only true within strict limits.

In a state governed by the rule of law, international agreements must be made public, actively supervised by the National Assembly, scrutinized by the press, and analyzed by the public.

Presenting the signing of 32 documents over four days as a diplomatic celebration, all while the actual content remains inaccessible and devoid of substantive discussion, is fundamentally a governance issue rather than a sign of mature diplomacy.

Relations with China may indeed be a “strategic choice,” but managing those relations transparently has yet to be treated as a mandatory principle, instead remaining treated as optional.

If transparency continues to be the weakest link, then every proclaimed “new height” in bilateral relations will fail to be genuinely new; rather, it will be accompanied by the same enduring questions.

The true development of a country proudly entering a “new era of growth” is not measured by the sheer volume of agreements or the rhetorical flourish of joint statements.

Instead, it is reflected in the ability of citizens to access, understand, and question the documents their government signs on their behalf.

The first, simple condition for that development is that those documents must be made public.

Thiên Di wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 20, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

People’s Public Security Newspaper (ANTV). “Party Chief, State President Concludes Successful State Visit to China.” April 17, 2026. https://antv.gov.vn/chinh-tri-2/tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-nuoc-ket-thuc-tot-dep-chuyen-tham-cap-nha-nuoc-den-trung-quoc-C105C6A1A.html

Vietnam News Agency (VietnamPlus). “Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung: Elevating Việt Nam–China Relations to a New Height.” April 17, 2026. https://www.vietnamplus.vn/bo-truong-ngoai-giao-le-hoai-trung-dua-quan-he-viet-trung-len-tam-cao-moi-post1105531.vnp

Vietnam News Agency (VietnamPlus). “Việt Nam and China Sign 32 Cooperation Agreements.” April 17, 2026. https://www.vietnamplus.vn/viet-nam-va-trung-quoc-ky-ket-32-van-kien-hop-tac-post1105603.vnp

Vietnam Women’s Newspaper. “32 Cooperation Agreements Signed During Party Chief and State President Tô Lâm’s Visit to China.” April 17, 2026. https://phunuvietnam.vn/32-van-kien-hop-tac-duoc-ky-ket-trong-chuyen-tham-trung-quoc-cua-tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-nuoc-to-lam-238260417190752712.htm

Sports & Culture Newspaper. “Việt Nam and China Sign 32 Cooperation Agreements.” April 17, 2026. https://thethaovanhoa.vn/viet-nam-va-trung-quoc-ky-32-van-kien-hop-tac-20260417183428637.htm