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In just the first year of his term as general secretary, Tô Lâm made official visits to 16 countries, surpassing all of his predecessors. Unlike previous general secretaries who typically focused on domestic governance and delegated most diplomatic activities to the prime minister and the president, Tô Lâm has been directly and deeply involved in both domestic and foreign affairs from the beginning. [1]

Because of this direct involvement, the diplomatic strategies unfolding today had already begun to shape the previous term. Now that Tô Lâm has concluded his formal visit to China—which took place from April 14 to 17—in his dual capacity as both general secretary and president, the question arises whether a more dynamic phase of diplomacy can be expected.

Based on the analysis in the study “ Tô Lâm’s Foreign Policy Leadership in the ‘Era of National Rise’ ” by scholars Hoàng Thị Hà and Phạm Thị Phương Thảo, published by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore) in October 2025, two positive signals had already emerged during Tô Lâm’s earlier tenure. These trends are highly likely to continue in the current term. [2]

Results-Oriented Economic Diplomacy

The most significant shift in foreign policy under Tô Lâm is arguably the elevation of economic diplomacy to a central, highly active role with new dimensions. Previously, Việt Nam’s economic diplomacy largely revolved around familiar goals, such as expanding markets, attracting investment, and maintaining a peaceful environment for development.

According to the study, those objectives have evolved further. Tô Lâm has argued that Việt Nam cannot continue serving merely as a global assembly hub or a dumping ground for outdated technology while domestic enterprises fail to build core technological capabilities.

From this viewpoint, economic diplomacy has to be redefined to focus on acquiring technology and long-term development capacity, rather than just bringing in capital.

This shift clearly shapes his foreign engagement priorities:

China: The focus extends beyond maintaining stable political relations to advancing cooperation in railway connectivity, logistics, artificial intelligence, and industrial collaboration.

The United States: Key priorities include attracting semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence (AI), high-tech investment, and workforce training, alongside building links with corporations such as Google, SpaceX, and Boeing.

Singapore and South Korea: The emphasis is on fostering innovation, developing high-tech industrial zones, and gradually shifting from assembly to research and development.

Russia and the Eurasian space: The primary focus lies in energy, logistics, and nuclear power.

In short, Việt Nam is deliberately diversifying its diplomatic relations to avoid excessive dependence on any single partner.

Proactive and Pragmatic Engagement with Major Powers

The second positive signal is that relations with major powers are faster-moving, more proactive, and sometimes willing to bypass convention. According to the study, Việt Nam under Tô Lâm is shifting toward a more flexible diplomatic approach and accepting a higher degree of political risk.

The most notable difference is the speed of response. For example, when U.S. President Donald Trump imposed steep tariffs on April 2, 2025, Việt Nam faces significant pressure due to its large trade surplus. [3]

By the evening of April 4, Tô Lâm became the first Southeast Asian leader to hold a direct phone call with Trump immediately following the announcement of the “reciprocal” tariff package, which opened the door for early negotiations. [4]

Four days later, he made the unusual move of dispatching Deputy Prime Minister Hồ Đức Phớc to Washington as a special envoy of the general secretary, a role traditionally handled by the government.

This proactive strategy extends to China as well. Tô Lâm chose Beijing for his first overseas visit as general secretary in August 2024 to quickly establish personal ties with the Chinese leadership after coming to power abruptly. This visit yielded a series of agreements on railways, logistics, ports, and supply chains.

Furthermore, on April 14, 2026, about one week after assuming the state presidency, he again chose China as his first destination . During this visit, he strongly advanced proposals on railway connectivity and raised the idea of visa exemptions for citizens of both countries. [5]

Overall, rather than merely maintaining a risk-averse balance, Việt Nam under Tô Lâm appears to be actively leveraging major power competition to expand its strategic space.

***

There are ongoing debates over political power and whether Tô Lâm has at times overstepped the traditional scope of his role. Setting those aside, his actions on the diplomatic front alone present strong grounds for expecting a much more dynamic period ahead during this term.

Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 16, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Annalise Keating. (2025, January 22). Hai lần Tô Lâm lấn sân Lương Cường . Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/01/hai-lan-to-lam-lan-san-luong-cuong/

2. Ha, H., Thi, P., & Thao, P. (2025). https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2025_75.pdf

3. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (2025, April 5). Thủ tướng Chính sẵn sàng đánh golf với Tổng thống Trump . BBC News Tiếng Việt. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cgkgxj6l31yo

4. baochinhphu.vn. (2025, April 4). Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm điện đàm với Tổng thống Hoa Kỳ Donald J. Trump . Baochinhphu.Vn. https://baochinhphu.vn/tong-bi-thu-to-lam-dien-dam-voi-tong-thong-hoa-ky-donald-j-trump-102250404231610635.htm 5. VIẾT THỊNH. (2026, April 15). Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Tô Lâm hội đàm với Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình . Báo Pháp Luật TP. Hồ Chí Minh. https://plo.vn/tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-nuoc-to-lam-hoi-dam-voi-tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-trung-quoc-tap-can-binh-post904340.html