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Is Cambodia’s campaign against online scam compounds genuinely effective, or is it largely a performance designed to ease mounting international pressure?

Despite claims of a large-scale crackdown over recent months, Amnesty International reports that many of these facilities continue to operate . From the report, the Cambodian government has failed to dismantle the majority of these sites nationwide, leaving thousands of trafficked, tortured, and enslaved individuals without adequate protection or assistance. [1]

Researchers identified 86 suspected scam centers, but they found evidence of government intervention at only 24 locations. Furthermore, these interventions often appeared reactive and incomplete . Alleged collusion between facility managers and police reportedly compromised several operations, and victims were sometimes relocated before or during the raids. [2]

Scam operations based in Cambodia have become a regional security problem, drawing victims, money flows, and law-enforcement attention across borders. For neighboring countries such as Việt Nam, these networks can fuel human trafficking, online fraud, and cross-border recruitment schemes that target both Vietnamese citizens and internet users abroad. This matter has also pushed regional governments to strengthen cooperation on policing, victim protection, and cybercrime enforcement.

More Rhetoric Than Results in Cambodia

Recent months have seen Cambodia repeatedly declare online fraud a national priority. To restore confidence among tourists, investors, and international partners, Prime Minister Hun Manet pledged to shut down these scam compounds entirely. [3]

On paper, the statistics are impressive. Authorities report that between July 2025 and mid-April 2026, government agencies took action against more than 250 online scam locations , shut down 91 casinos, and arrested, prosecuted, or deported thousands of individuals. [4]

However, the reality reveals a gap between political rhetoric and implementation. The campaign has failed in two critical areas: dismantling the most notorious compounds and providing adequate protection or assistance to victims who escape. [5]

The crackdown appears to be a highly performative exercise rather than a genuinely transformative operation.

The core of the scam network remains intact, allowing the organizers, financiers, protectors, and money launderers to continue their operations by simply relocating or adopting more concealed tactics.

The campaign is ineffective because authorities do not dismantle entrenched criminal networks and consistently fail to distinguish between coerced victims and the actual beneficiaries of the industry.

Incomplete Crackdowns Create Greater Risks

While Cambodia’s selective anti-scam operations may generate short-term successes, research suggests that they are incapable of dismantling the broader scam economy. Rather than eliminating the threat, these incomplete crackdowns encourage criminal networks to adapt and target new victim demographics. [6]

As major compounds face increased scrutiny, operators simply shift toward smaller, dispersed, and harder-to-monitor facilities, or they relocate across borders into neighboring regions.

Additionally, this partial enforcement leaves thousands of foreign workers stranded without employment, housing, or legal documentation. Such precarious conditions increase the likelihood of re-recruitment into scam operations, which threatens to ignite a broader humanitarian crisis. [7]

The influence of Chinese criminal organizations and investors also complicates the issue. [8] Even as Beijing intensifies its overseas anti-fraud campaigns, these syndicates adapt rapidly . They pivot to target victims in wealthier nations or expand their operations into new territories, ensuring their presence in Cambodia remains highly resilient. [9]

Criminal Organizations Becoming More Sophisticated

Suspicions regarding the connections between criminal syndicates and influential elites have intensified following several high-profile cases.

Specifically, the case of Chen Zhi— accused of orchestrating a major transnational criminal network in Cambodia—raises questions regarding how deeply these syndicates have penetrated the political and economic systems of the country. [10]

Although Cambodian authorities claim that they were entirely unaware of Chen Zhi’s alleged illegal activities, the situation fuels doubts about the true comprehensiveness of the government crackdown.

Cambodia faces a dilemma. Phnom Penh must navigate intense pressure from China, the United States, ASEAN countries, foreign embassies, and human rights organizations. Yet, these scam compounds flourished within an economic environment intimately linked to casinos, real estate, foreign investment, and entrenched local patronage networks.

Modern scam centers have grown into transnational corporations that use cutting-edge technology, strong recruitment systems, armed security, complex money-laundering networks, and strong local ties to move money across borders with ease. Confronting this infrastructure poses a challenge that currently exceeds the management capacity of the authorities.

Ultimately, while partial crackdowns may signal to the international community that the state is taking action, they remain insufficient to dismantle a criminal economy that is already deeply rooted.

Without Cambodia's effective crackdown on scam operations, Việt Nam faces mounting cross-border threats: citizens lured by fake job offers into compounds and coerced into fraud, and internet users exploited by increasingly sophisticated schemes. Such actions would strain Việt Nam's law enforcement and victim-support systems, demanding urgent regional cooperation, at least between Cambodia and Việt Nam.

Nguyễn Hải wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 18, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

Amnesty International, “Cambodia: Evidence Suggests Scamming Compounds Bypassed Despite High-Profile ‘Crackdown,’” Amnesty International , June 8, 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/06/cambodia-evidence-suggests-scamming-compounds-bypassed-despite-high-profile-crackdown/ .

Reuters, “Amnesty Says Cambodia Scam Centres Still Operating Despite Crackdowns,” Reuters , June 8, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/amnesty-says-cambodia-scam-centres-still-operating-despite-crackdowns-2026-06-08/ .

Jonathan Head and L. L., “Fake Australian, Chinese and Brazilian Police Stations: BBC Goes Inside a Seized Scam Compound,” BBC , April 7, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjenpy8gx71o .

China Daily , “Scam Crackdown Creates New Problem,” China Daily, May 19, 2026, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202605/19/WS6a0bc193a310d6866eb49642.html .

See Amnesty International , “Cambodia: Evidence Suggests Scamming Compounds Bypassed Despite High-Profile ‘Crackdown.’”

J. Zhang, “China’s Selective Anti-Scam Campaign Poses a Paradox for Southeast Asia,” East Asia Forum , March 9, 2026, https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/03/09/chinas-selective-anti-scam-campaign-poses-a-paradox-for-southeast-asia/ .

See China Daily , “Scam Crackdown Creates New Problem.”

E. Sasipornkarn, “Cambodia: Alleged Cyber Scam Boss Extradited to China,” DW , January 4, 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/cambodia-alleged-cyber-scam-boss-extradited-to-china/a-76619267 .

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Protecting Americans from China-Linked Scam Centers: An Update on Emerging Trends,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission , May 3, 2026, https://www.uscc.gov/research/protecting-americans-china-linked-scam-centers-update-emerging-trends .

R. Ratcliffe, “‘Industrial-Scale Scams’ and a State Allegedly ‘Co-opted’: What the Rise and Fall of the Prince Group Means for Cambodia,” The Guardian , March 17, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/18/prince-group-chen-zhi-scam-industry-cambodia .