Become a Member for $9.99/month

The South China Sea is often framed through moments of visible confrontation, with ships colliding, coast guard standoffs, diplomatic protests, and arbitration rulings that briefly capture global attention before fading from the headlines. But this episodic visibility marks a deeper and more consequential transformation in the strategic behavior of the region’s actors.

In a detailed interview with The Vietnamese Magazine, Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues that one of the most significant yet underappreciated developments today is Việt Nam’s gradual transition from a primarily coastal defender to a forward-operating maritime power in the Spratly Islands.

This evolution, he suggests, is not a sudden escalation but a long-term structural shift that is steadily reshaping the balance of power with China and increasing the likelihood of sustained, low-level confrontation at sea.

Poling emphasizes that we should not understand what is unfolding as a traditional crisis. Instead, it is a cumulative process that has been building for years, shaped by incremental decisions, responses to Chinese pressure, and a gradual recalibration of Việt Nam’s maritime doctrine.

In this interpretation, Việt Nam’s behavior reflects adaptation rather than open provocation. The country is responding to an environment in which China’s maritime presence has become more permanent, more assertive, and more capable of influencing energy exploration, fishing activity, and navigation in disputed waters.

Việt Nam’s expanded construction activity in the Spratly Islands is at the center of this transformation. According to Poling, the country has moved well beyond the symbolic occupation of maritime features and is now systematically developing infrastructure to support sustained operational deployment.

Across multiple features, Việt Nam has built or expanded small ports, improved logistics facilities, and, in some cases, developed airstrips capable of supporting aircraft operations. These installations are being complemented by radar systems, surveillance infrastructure, and facilities designed to support coast guard and fisheries enforcement vessels operating further from the mainland than ever before.

What makes this phase particularly significant is that it reflects a change in operational philosophy. Việt Nam is no longer simply maintaining a presence in the Spratlys; it is reinforcing sovereignty claims by building an architecture of control.

This architecture is designed to enable continuous monitoring of maritime space, rapid deployment of enforcement vessels, and greater responsiveness to incidents involving Chinese maritime forces.

In practical terms, this means Việt Nam is shifting from a reactive coastal defense posture to a forward-deployed maritime strategy that extends its operational reach deeper into contested waters.

Poling attributes this strategic shift to Beijing’s intensified maritime coercion, particularly the sustained pressure on Vietnamese offshore energy activities over the past several years.

Chinese vessels have repeatedly maintained a presence near Vietnamese oil and gas exploration sites, creating a persistent operational friction that does not escalate into open conflict but significantly raises the cost and complexity of resource extraction.

From Việt Nam’s perspective, this environment reveals a structural vulnerability: its economic lifelines in offshore energy are increasingly vulnerable to interference from a rival that operates closer to the disputed areas and can sustain longer deployments.

The logical response, Poling argues, has been to reduce this asymmetry by moving Vietnamese operational capacity closer to the contested zones themselves. By building and reinforcing infrastructure in the Spratlys, Việt Nam is seeking to close the distance between its enforcement capabilities and the areas it seeks to protect.

Such a strategy does not eliminate Chinese advantages, but it narrows the gap in response time and increases Việt Nam’s ability to contest China’s presence more directly.

China’s Calculated Pressure Game

At the same time, China has reacted with a combination of restraint and parallel expansion. Publicly, Beijing has issued relatively limited statements regarding Việt Nam’s island-building activities, suggesting an interest in avoiding a premature escalation.

Poling, however, notes that this rhetorical caution accompanies ongoing physical expansion in other areas of the South China Sea, particularly in the Paracels. Infrastructure development at sites such as Antelope Reef is rapidly advancing, bringing Chinese operational capacity closer to Việt Nam’s central coastline and fishing grounds.

Poling highlights that this dual dynamic–Việt Nam expanding in the Spratlys while China strengthens its positions in the Paracels–creates a geographically dispersed but increasingly interconnected pattern of competition.

Rather than a single focal point of tension, the South China Sea is becoming a lattice of overlapping zones where both sides are increasing their ability to monitor, intercept, and respond to each other’s activities.

This structure does not necessarily lead to an immediate escalation of the crisis, but it significantly increases the frequency of contact between opposing maritime forces.

To understand why this issue matters, Poling situates the present moment within a broader historical continuum of China–Việt Nam maritime relations.

The dispute is not a recent phenomenon but one embedded in centuries of political and military interaction. In Việt Nam, resistance to Chinese influence is a deeply rooted national narrative reinforced through education, historical memory, and political identity. This narrative is not abstract; concrete historical episodes continue to reinforce it and shape strategic thinking in both capitals.

Among the most important of these episodes is the 1979 border war between China and Việt Nam, which, although primarily land-based, had a lasting impact on bilateral perceptions of threat and resilience.

A more direct historic precedent is the 1988 Johnson Reef skirmish in the Spratly Islands, where a violent clash with Chinese forces left more than 60 Vietnamese personnel dead. This incident remains a defining moment in Việt Nam’s modern strategic consciousness and continues to be commemorated domestically as evidence of both vulnerability and resistance.

Later, in 2014, the deployment of a Chinese deepwater oil rig into disputed waters triggered one of the most intense maritime confrontations in recent decades. Việt Nam responded with an unusually sustained deployment of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, engaging in persistent harassment and physical obstruction of Chinese operations.

The confrontation escalated to a point where China withdrew the rig earlier than planned, an outcome widely interpreted in Việt Nam as a tactical success and in China as a controlled de-escalation.

More recently, from 2021 onward, a quieter but sustained pattern of pressure has emerged around Vietnamese offshore energy projects, particularly in the Nam Con Son basin. Chinese vessels have maintained a prolonged presence near exploration sites, effectively constraining operations without triggering open confrontation. Việt Nam’s decision to proceed with expansion in these fields despite sustained interference suggests it has adopted a higher risk tolerance to preserve its long-term energy security.

Việt Nam’s Asymmetric Maritime Doctrine

Against this backdrop, Việt Nam’s accelerated island-building campaign, which began in late 2022 and intensified in 2023, appears less like a new strategy and more like a structural adjustment to an evolving threat environment.

The goal is not to achieve dominance, but to ensure that Việt Nam no longer reacts from distant coastal bases. Instead, it seeks to operate from within the contested space.

Poling stresses that Việt Nam’s approach remains fundamentally asymmetric. The country is not attempting to match China ship-for-ship or aircraft-for-aircraft. Instead, it relies on a mix of limited but capable naval assets, including Russian-supplied Kilo-class submarines, a modest air force, and a dispersed network of fortified outposts across the Spratlys.

These capabilities are sufficient to complicate Chinese operations, particularly in localized encounters, but they do not alter the broader regional balance of power.

The essence of Việt Nam’s strategy is deterrence through denial rather than deterrence through dominance. It seeks to ensure that any Chinese attempt to assert control over disputed areas would encounter resistance significant enough to impose costs and uncertainty.

This logic is reinforced by historical precedent: Việt Nam has repeatedly demonstrated, in 1988, 2014 and other incidents, that it is willing to resist coercion even against a stronger adversary.

A key comparative dimension of Poling’s analysis lies in the contrast between Việt Nam and the Philippines. While both countries face overlapping disputes with China, their strategic responses diverge sharply.

The Philippines has increasingly embraced external security partnerships, deepening ties with the United States, Japan, Australia, France, and other partners in what amounts to a networked deterrence strategy.

Việt Nam, by contrast, adheres to its three-no's doctrine established in its 1998 Defense White Paper, which prohibits formal military alliances, foreign bases, and alignment with one state against another.

Despite these differences, Poling observes a gradual convergence in behavior if not in doctrine. Việt Nam and the Philippines are increasingly aligned in practical terms, particularly in coast guard coordination, legal interpretations of maritime entitlements, and shared concerns over coercive Chinese behavior.

This convergence does not erase their strategic divergence, but it creates a parallel track of cooperation that operates beneath formal alliance structures.

The South China Sea: Teetering on the Brink of Permanent Crisis

Looking forward, Poling identifies several indicators that will shape the trajectory of regional stability. Shifts in Chinese patrol patterns, particularly reallocations between Scarborough Shoal, the Spratlys, and the Paracels, will provide early signals of strategic prioritization.

Diplomatic developments, including negotiations over a South China Sea Code of Conduct within an ASEAN framework, may temporarily modulate tensions but are unlikely to resolve underlying disputes. Similarly, symbolic political events like the anniversary of the 2016 arbitral ruling could serve as catalysts for renewed diplomatic and operational signaling.

Perhaps most importantly, the continued expansion of Chinese infrastructure in the western Paracels creates a new source of potential friction, particularly in areas close to Vietnamese fishing grounds. This development could shift the focus of tensions northward and create additional pressure points along Việt Nam’s coastal economic zones.

Poling’s assessment portrays a region entering a phase of intensified structural competition rather than an episodic crisis. The South China Sea is evolving into a densely populated maritime environment in which multiple actors operate overlapping systems of surveillance, enforcement, protection, and deterrence in close proximity.

Việt Nam’s island-building campaign is a central component of this transformation, not because it dramatically shifts the balance of power, but because it changes the geometry of interaction between rival forces.

The paradox at the heart of this evolution is that both China and Việt Nam appear to prefer stability over conflict, yet both are systematically constructing the capabilities that make accidental escalation more likely.

As operational proximity increases and interactions multiply, the boundary between routine enforcement and strategic confrontation becomes increasingly blurred. In this environment, even minor incidents at sea can reverberate far beyond their immediate location, shaping perceptions, triggering responses, and gradually redefining the rules of engagement in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions.

Việt Nam’s Islands Policy and the South China Sea Dispute

RELATED POSTS

Threatened by Police, Cut From the News: Vĩnh Hưng Residents Join Việt Nam’s Growing Fight to Keep Land From Developers

China Holds Live-Fire Drills in Gulf of Tonkin, 75 Kilometers From Móng Cái Market, Việt Nam

Police Get More Power, Citizens Face Bigger Fines Under New Cybersecurity Decrees

Jacopo Romanelli

Related Posts

The U.S.-China AI Chip War: Why Southeast Asia Cannot Remain Neutral

A Decade After the South China Sea Ruling: Geopolitics, ASEAN, and International Law

Trump’s Anti-Communist Rhetoric: Three Major Risks for U.S.-Việt Nam Relations

ASEAN and the Challenge of Centralization in Southeast Asia

Cambodia Steps Up Crackdown on Scam Operations. Will That Be Enough?

Hà Nội’s Deeper Ambitions Behind AFF 2026

Religion Bulletin - May 2026: Authorities in Different Provinces Intensify Crackdown on Independent Religious Groups

The Bắc Ninh Diocese: Doing the Journalism Việt Nam’s State Media Leaves Undone

OPINIONS

Southern Vietnamese Changed After 1975. Loving the Old Words Doesn’t Mean Fighting the New Ones.

Four Journalists Are in Prison in Việt Nam. Their Mother, Sister, and Wives Demand Their Release

Canada and the West Cannot Ignore Việt Nam’s Human Rights Record

POPULAR STORIES

Hà Nội ‘Justice Tree’: Social Media Users Demand Investigation into Former Lawmaker Nguyễn Sỹ Cương

Việt Nam Culture Ministry Blocks Threads Posts Accusing Nguyễn Sỹ Cương

Religion Bulletin – April 2026 – Việt Nam Passes Amended Religion Law As Authorities Prosecute Four Independent Protestants

Post-1975 Tragedy: The Grim Reality of Life in Vietnam’s Re-education Camps

Former Deputy Nguyễn Sỹ Cương Trends on Vietnamese Social Media Following Rap Album Censorship