South China Sea Dispute: China’s Fishing Ban and Việt Nam’s Land Reclamation

In May 2026, two events unfolded almost simultaneously in the South China Sea.

On one side, China enacted its annual fishing ban from May 1 to Aug. 16, which encompasses areas within Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone. [1] 

In response, the Vietnam Fisheries Society submitted a protest letter to three ministries. [2] Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson “requested that China respect Việt Nam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, as well as its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over Việt Nam’s maritime zones.” [3]

On the other side, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at CSIS published satellite imagery on May 8 revealing that Việt Nam had reclaimed an additional 216 hectares of land in the Spratly Islands over the previous year. 

This development brings the cumulative total of artificial land to more than 1,120 hectares. [4]

Viewed together, these concurrent developments demonstrate that the territorial dispute in the South China Sea operates on two parallel fronts, with each utilizing an entirely different language.

China’s Recurring Fishing Ban

China’s annual summer fishing ban has lost its element of surprise, having been imposed every year without interruption since 1999. 

Now in its 27th consecutive year, the ban encompasses the Gulf of Tonkin, waters beyond the gulf’s mouth, and Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone north of the Spratly Islands. 

It applies strictly to foreign vessels, with Chinese authorities actively confiscating the boats and gear of those found in violation.

Việt Nam’s annual response is just as predictable. The government issues formal protesting statements, declares the ban invalid, delivers diplomatic notes, and advises its fishermen to operate in organized groups for safety. [5] 

This year, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson reiterated that “Việt Nam’s position is consistent and has been clearly affirmed over the years.” 

However, a close reading of this statement reveals a quiet acknowledgment: this consistent legal stance has failed to produce any significant change on the water for nearly three decades.

From a legal standpoint, Việt Nam is entirely correct. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits any country from enforcing a fishing ban within another state’s exclusive economic zone. 

Furthermore, the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration invalidated the nine-dash line, which China uses to justify these bans. China’s refusal to recognize the ruling does not diminish its authority under international law.

Importantly, China’s strategy extends beyond administrative bans. It runs a parallel “gray zone” operation designed to exert pressure just below the threshold of armed conflict. This involves deploying fishing fleets directed by maritime militia units, which coordinate with coast guard vessels to patrol, obstruct, and expel foreign fishermen from disputed waters.

These operations have become increasingly dangerous and flexible since China’s Coast Guard Law took effect in 2021, and especially following new regulations introduced in June 2024, all while maintaining their gray-zone nature to avoid military escalation. [6] 

Supporting this, AIS data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence show that since December 2025, the number of Chinese paramilitary vessels operating off the coast of Việt Nam has increased rapidly. [7]

The problem is that being legally correct does not automatically guarantee practical success. For 27 years, the summer fishing ban has returned precisely on schedule, targeting the exact same waters.

Việt Nam’s Reclamation Race

Meanwhile, on the second front, Việt Nam has been actively advancing its own territorial interests.

As of May 2026, all 21 features controlled by Việt Nam in the Spratly Islands have undergone expansion through land reclamation, according to AMTI. This represents a drastic transformation from four years prior, when 11 of these features were merely small concrete structures. 

The region now hosts 15 Vietnamese ports, with 11 constructed since 2021. Given this rapid pace, AMTI analysts suggest Việt Nam is on track to surpass China in total artificial land area within the Spratlys.

The focal point of these efforts is Barque Canada Reef, which AMTI identifies as Việt Nam’s largest feature in the area. A runway of approximately 2,400 meters is nearing completion, large enough to accommodate most military aircraft, and has subsequently prompted protests from China. 

Furthermore, ammunition depots, residential compounds, and anti-landing trench systems have been constructed on several newly expanded features. [8]

Việt Nam maintains that these expansions are for civilian purposes and fisheries logistics. The presence of active fishing ports, medical stations, and civilian delegations partially supports this claim. 

However, AMTI director Greg Poling noted that the new facilities are “consistent with previous reports that Việt Nam has deployed rocket systems on several islands,” alongside “a network of anti-landing trenches.”

Addressing this reclamation program, Bill Hayton of Chatham House stated it reveals Hà Nội is expending substantial resources to “protect its positions in the Spratlys.” Another Chatham House author cautioned that these activities have “opened Pandora’s box,” which could trigger a competitive reclamation race among regional claimants. [9] 

Regardless of the official terminology, the reality remains that Việt Nam is establishing the capacity for a long-term, continuous presence on its claimed features.

However, observers less frequently note that China is conducting similar reclamation operations in the Paracels.

In April 2026, BBC News Vietnamese highlighted accelerated Chinese construction at Bombay Reef in the Paracel Islands. A CSIS report from March 19 indicated that China had reclaimed approximately 603 hectares at the site. 

Remarkably, in only six months, this figure reached nearly half the scale of Beijing’s total reclamation efforts in the Trường Sa Islands from 2014 to 2016. Active infrastructure at Bombay Reef now includes piers, internal roadways, and dredging vessels.

Experts informed the BBC that Bombay Reef is poised to become a vital new base for China in the western Paracels, likely featuring an airstrip. Greg Poling described the initiative as an implicit message from Beijing that “they are not simply going to sit back and do nothing while Việt Nam ramps up island reclamation.”

In other words, this reclamation competition is far from one-sided. Rather than focusing solely on the Spratlys, China is operating on a broader chessboard in the Paracels, a territory where Việt Nam lost control in 1974.

Two Strategies, Two Logics

Việt Nam appears to be pursuing two parallel strategies, each driven by a distinct logic.

The first strategy relies on diplomatic protests across legal and reputational fronts. This approach is essential to prevent Việt Nam from appearing to acquiesce to China’s unilateral actions, as failing to protest would establish a dangerous precedent. But after 27 years, it is clear that diplomatic protests alone are not enough to change how Beijing acts.

At the multilateral level, Việt Nam and ASEAN continue to advocate for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), a document intended to provide a legally binding framework for all involved parties. 

ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn has established a goal to conclude these negotiations in 2026. [10] Despite this timeline, the actual prospects for a resolution remain unpromising; Việt Nam and the Philippines advocate for a “hard” and binding code, whereas China prefers bilateral solutions and actively seeks to exclude third parties, particularly the United States. [11] This gap has remained largely unchanged despite years of ongoing negotiations.

The second strategy is executed on the ground through land reclamation and infrastructure construction. This strategy represents a pragmatic response to a difficult reality: if Việt Nam cannot prevent China from dominating the waters it currently controls, it must simultaneously fortify its capacity to maintain a presence in the territories it still holds.

This dual approach explains why the diplomatic protests against the fishing ban and the aggressive reclamation efforts are not contradictory. They merely operate on two different fronts of the same prolonged dispute.

The April Paradox

One specific detail from recent events deserves particular attention.

During a visit by Vietnamese leaders to China in April 2026, the two nations signed numerous cooperation agreements, with Hà Nội explicitly defining its relations with Beijing as a “strategic priority.” 

However, reports indicated that the South China Sea issue saw “virtually no significant progress and remained constrained within the bilateral agenda.”

Just a month later, China implemented its annual fishing ban, and Việt Nam simultaneously continued dumping sand to expand its outposts in the Spratly Islands.

These developments are not necessarily contradictory. Many international relationships are governed by the pragmatic logic of “cooperate where possible, compete where necessary.” 

Nevertheless, the sequence of events demonstrates that diplomatic agreements forged at high-level meetings do not automatically translate into behavioral changes on the water. Evidently, both sides fully understand this reality.

The Gap Remains

In territorial disputes, strengthening a long-term physical presence to reduce dependence on an adversary’s goodwill is a standard strategic approach.

Viewed through this lens, the reclamation efforts in the Spratly Islands represent an attempt by Việt Nam to narrow the gap between its claimed legal rights and its actual operational capabilities at sea. 

However, the annual fishing ban, now repeated for the 27th year, serves as a reminder that this gap remains.

While Việt Nam possesses theoretical rights under international law, the reality at sea dictates that fishermen are still advised to “remain vigilant about the possibility of detention.”

Ultimately, this enduring gap is where the true problem lies.

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Thiên Di wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 28, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.