Land Rights in Việt Nam: Three Systemic Reasons Why Vietnamese Citizens Can Easily Lose Their Property

“One day you wake up and realize you are about to lose everything, not because of anything you did, but because the state decided so even though you did nothing wrong. It is truly bitter.” 

This sentiment captures the recent concerns of many residents living along the Red River floodplain. [1]

Since early May 2026, when Hà Nội authorities first considered a plan to relocate all communities outside the dike system for the Red River Scenic Boulevard Project, hundreds of thousands of people have lived in fear of losing their land. [2]

Interestingly, most residents within the project area are no longer asking whether their land will be taken. They are asking more practical questions: When will the land be acquired? How much compensation will be paid? Where will our families go?

This mindset did not emerge by chance. It is deeply rooted in collective social memory and experiences formed over many years of land acquisitions, where outcomes have rarely favored ordinary citizens. 

What lies behind this reality, and why does land acquisition in Việt Nam so often proceed with such ease?

Land-Use Rights, Not Ownership Rights

The foundational issue lies within the legal framework of land policy in Việt Nam, where private ownership of land is unrecognized.

Article 53 of the Constitution dictates that land belongs to the entire people, with the state acting as the representative owner and exercising unified management. [3] This core principle is reaffirmed in Article 197 of the Civil Code and Article 2 of the current Land Law. [4] [5]

Because land is under “ownership by the entire people,” citizens’ rights over it differ drastically from their rights over personal assets like electronics or vehicles. While ordinary property affords owners full rights of possession, use, and disposition, citizens hold only land-use rights regarding real estate.

In reality, a parcel of land often represents a family’s most valuable asset, built through years of labor and savings. Legally, however, these individuals are land users rather than landowners, which is precisely why legal contracts refer to “transfers of land-use rights” rather than “land sales.”

Current Vietnamese law lacks a definitive conceptualization of land-use rights; it is generally understood as a bundle of rights granted by the state through land allocation, leasing, or official recognition. 

Citizens certainly possess tangible rights; they can use certificates to transfer, inherit, mortgage, or donate their interests, but these rights are heavily subjected to state control and oversight.

This framework creates an imbalance of power. Citizens cannot stand on equal footing in land disputes when the state simultaneously acts as the representative owner, the regulatory authority, and the ultimate decision-maker regarding reclamation. 

When the state decides to acquire land, a citizen cannot simply hold up a land-use certificate and refuse. This contrasts sharply with ordinary civil transactions involving private property.

In many democratic countries, land is treated as private property. Governments seeking to claim private land for public use must adhere to strict legal constraints, demonstrating necessity, legality, and adequate compensation. 

Disagreeing citizens have the right to challenge the government before an independent court. In the United States, individuals may even have the right to use deadly force in certain circumstances to defend their homes or property. [6]

In Việt Nam, citizens cannot declare, “This is my land, and I refuse to sell it.” They are limited to objecting to the state’s acquisition plan. Hence, disputes over land inevitably devolve into negotiations over compensation levels and resettlement support, rather than a debate over whether the state has the right to take the land in the first place.

Extensive Legal Grounds for Land Acquisition

Beyond acting as the representative owner of all land—a position that immediately disadvantages citizens—the state has established a vast array of circumstances justifying land acquisition.

Under Chapter 6 of the current Land Law, authorities can reclaim land for numerous reasons, including national defense, security, socio-economic development in the public interest, violations of land laws, termination of use, voluntary return, or threats to human life. [7] 

This authority was expanded on Dec. 11, 2025, when the National Assembly adopted Resolution No. 254/2025 to address difficulties in implementing the Land Law. [8] The resolution added three specific circumstances permitting state land acquisition for projects within free-trade zones and international financial centers. [9] 

On the same day, the National Assembly passed another resolution creating special mechanisms for major development projects in Hà Nội. This permits land acquisition beyond standard Land Law provisions for projects serving national or public interests, as directed by competent authorities. [10]

Fundamentally, governments must possess the power to acquire land; infrastructure like roads, bridges, hospitals, and military facilities requires it. However, the issue is not the existence of these powers but their breadth, their beneficiaries, and the protections afforded to displaced citizens.

In Việt Nam, the scope of land acquisition is exceptionally broad. The category of “socio-economic development for national or public interests” is notoriously difficult to define narrowly, and this ambiguity permeates the law. 

Article 79 of the current Land Law allows acquisition when it is “truly necessary” for “socio-economic development for national or public interests,” linking the provision to objectives such as maximizing resources, improving efficiency, developing infrastructure, and ensuring social welfare. Notably, compared to the 2013 Land Law, the 2024 Land Law now identifies 32 specific categories of projects eligible for acquisition under these socio-economic grounds. [11]

While enumerating specific circumstances might appear to limit discretionary authority, terms like “socio-economic development” and “public interest” remain ambiguous. Without independent oversight, these categories easily encompass projects where public and private commercial interests overlap. 

In practice, numerous commercial ventures have advanced under the guise of “socio-economic development,” such as the massive land acquisition in Văn Giang, Hưng Yên Province, for the Ecopark urban development project. [12] 

More recently, residents impacted by the Red River Scenic Boulevard Project have petitioned to remove commercial elements—including golf courses, resorts, and luxury housing—from the development. [13]

Ideally, authorities should be required to demonstrate genuine necessity through impact assessments, public consultations, and independent oversight to ensure land is taken solely for legitimate public purposes. 

Projects that generate revenue but effectively transfer assets from vulnerable communities to private investors should face rigorous scrutiny, modification, or potential cancellation. [14] 

However, in Việt Nam, such oversight mechanisms remain weak. Once a project is incorporated into planning documents, approved in principle, and assigned a compensation scheme, the path to acquisition is virtually finalized, leaving citizens with limited legal grounds to challenge the decision.

Marginalized Public Voices

Another reason why citizens in Việt Nam easily lose their land is that their voices often have little influence. This issue does not merely begin when investment plans receive approval or compensation proposals get drafted; it originates much earlier within the legislative process itself.

In recent years, public input regarding lawmaking has become increasingly weak, with draft laws concerning land, investment, and planning often adopted at remarkable speed. [15] 

For instance, the government enacted legal instruments that grant Hà Nội authorities sweeping authority over project approval and land acquisition with minimal meaningful public participation. 

This includes Resolution No. 258 on special mechanisms for major development projects in Hà Nội, issued on Dec. 11, 2025, and effective the next day, alongside the amended Capital Law, passed on April 23, 2026, and effective July 1, 2026. [16] [17]

Legally, compensation and resettlement plans must be publicly posted and discussed with affected residents, as Article 87 of the 2024 Land Law explicitly mandates consultation prior to acquisition. [18] 

However, in practice, these consultations rarely reflect the actual views of the residents, and public feedback lacks the power to alter final decisions. 

For example, since May 2026, residents affected by the Red River Scenic Boulevard Project have published articles and submitted petitions urging authorities to preserve existing communities and provide fair compensation. [19] [20] 

Yet, instead of pausing the project to address these grievances, the investor merely proposed accelerating the land-clearance schedule. [21]

History provides several tragic precedents regarding resistance to state land acquisitions, notably Đồng Tâm in 2020, Văn Giang in 2012, and the case of Đoàn Văn Vươn in 2012. [22] [23] [24] [25] 

These incidents demonstrate that the state ultimately reclaims the land regardless of citizen consent, and stronger resistance often yields more tragic outcomes. Citizens in Việt Nam remain vulnerable to land loss not simply due to isolated administrative rulings but because the overarching power structure governing land places them in a fundamentally subordinate position.

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Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 8, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.