Việt Nam’s Resolution 68 and What ‘National Entrepreneurs’ Can Learn from Hungary’s Development Strategy

Economist Trần Đình Thiên recently promoted the concepts of “national entrepreneurs” and “national enterprises,” apparently in the spirit of Resolution 68 regarding the private sector. The idea sounds appealing, but a look at Hungary suggests that there are reasons for caution.

Before discussing present-day Hungary, let me recount an old story.

In 1968, I served as an interpreter in Hungary during an informal dinner between the family of Nguyễn Duy Trinh, Việt Nam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and his Hungarian counterpart. 

During the conversation, Trinh mentioned his visit to the Dazhai People’s Commune in China, remarking that if that was what socialism looked like, there was no point to it. He added that he had also visited North Korea and did not know what to call its political system.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter János replied, “We call that system ‘feudal fascism,’ comrade.” He then cited a Hungarian proverb: “A wise person learns from the losses of others” (Más kárán tanul az okos).

With his characteristic wit, Nguyễn Duy Trinh responded, “We have not even learned from our own losses,” which prompted laughter around the table.

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Issued by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Việt Nam (CPV) on May 4, 2025, Resolution 68-NQ/TW regarding private-sector development was warmly welcomed by the public. [1] 

The resolution declares that “the private economy is one of the most important drivers of the national economy, a pioneering force promoting growth, job creation, and national competitiveness.” 

Its stated aim is to build an economy that is “self-reliant, self-sufficient, resilient, and deeply integrated into the international community in a substantive and effective manner, helping the country escape the risk of falling behind and achieve prosperous development.”

This represents a significant, commendable leap forward in the CPV’s understanding of the private sector. It would have been even better, however, had the resolution omitted the word “one” from that quoted sentence. Furthermore, while points two, three, and four in the “guiding viewpoints” section are highly praiseworthy, point five remains potentially controversial.

The numerical targets outlined in the resolution’s objectives are debatable and warrant thorough discussion. Rather than fixating on numerical benchmarks, the objectives should have emphasized core policy issues: creating a legal environment and incentives that empower all private enterprises to compete fairly, innovate, improve governance, accept risk, and access civilized bankruptcy procedures. [2] 

Above all, policymakers must avoid picking winners through preferential treatment and subsidies. [3] They should also steer clear of chasing highly specific quantitative targets, such as “two million enterprises” or “at least 20 enterprises participating in global value chains.” Such goals are too modest and largely meaningless [4] and also risk encouraging determined efforts to achieve them regardless of potentially severe unintended consequences.

Perhaps inspired by the spirit of Resolution 68, Associate Professor Dr. Trần Đình Thiên has advocated for the creation of “national enterprises” and “national entrepreneurs” that would “co-create” economic institutions and structures alongside the state. [5] 

Thiên argues that “national entrepreneurs should not merely pursue legitimate wealth but must also be willing to sacrifice their assets and efforts for national competitiveness, national development, and the common interests of the nation.”

I am uneasy with these vague concepts and lofty appeals. They sound more like political slogans and are highly open to debate—which is precisely where the lessons of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary become relevant.

Orbán justified cultivating a strong class of “national capitalists” by invoking self-reliance, national security, and national advancement. If you replace the word “capitalists” with “entrepreneurs,” the similarity between Orbán’s rhetoric and that of Trần Đình Thiên becomes striking, both in language and, perhaps, in substance.

What were the results of Orbán’s economic policies? 

A disaster.

The Orbán regime—aptly described as a “mafia state” by sociologist Magyar Bálint—collapsed on April 12, 2026, when the Tisza Party won a landslide victory and secured over two-thirds of the seats in Hungary’s Parliament. [6] 

A core economic strategy of this regime between 2010 and 2026 was to cultivate a “national capitalist” class. The regime achieved its goals through ownership restructuring, public procurement, and various preferential policies designed to benefit loyal businesspeople.

Hungarian scholars have heavily studied and scrutinized this process, notably Voszka Éva, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in her inaugural lecture. [7] 

Éva notes that Orbán’s strategy involved transformative ownership changes over 15 years via waves of nationalization and privatization. This created a highly wasteful system she terms “political ownership,” which distorted markets, established monopolies, and severely hindered Hungary’s broader economic development. 

While correcting these policies is possible, it will come at a considerable cost. A Tisza Party bill aimed at reversing these distortions is currently expected to pass in Parliament; readers would certainly benefit from studying Voszka’s research.

In practice, Orbán’s government meticulously picked winners. Businesses the state disliked—whether domestic, joint ventures, or foreign-invested—were pressured into selling their assets to the government at below-market rates, often under the guise of economic security or national sovereignty. Conversely, the state permitted favored enterprises to sell their assets at inflated prices. 

Following nationalization and cosmetic restructuring, these assets were then re-privatized and handed over to political allies at bargain prices, or sometimes for free. This massive transfer of wealth was facilitated through customized legislation, opaque regulations, tax incentives, land allocations, preferential credit, and public procurement contracts. [8]

Beneficiaries included media organizations that amplified government propaganda, sidelined independent outlets, and restricted press freedom. Orbán’s network of allies accumulated wealth at an astonishing rate. Meanwhile, the phenomenon of “soft budget constraints,” a concept identified long ago by economist János Kornai, infected the entire economy.

As a result, economic development stagnated. None of these favored enterprises ever achieved meaningful international competitiveness. Hungary, once one of the strongest post-communist nations to join the European Union, steadily tumbled toward the bottom of the bloc. 

Inequality surged, and corruption scandals—frequently legalized by laws passed under the pretext of strengthening private enterprise—sparked massive public outrage. The devastating reality behind these supposedly patriotic policies drove voters to dismantle the mafia state, decisively rejecting Orbán’s Fidesz Party in favor of Tisza.

Magyar Bálint and Madlovics Bálint argue that this type of state has two primary characteristics. First is the concentration of power within the hands of a political boss and his patronage network. Second is the rapid enrichment of that boss, his family, and the protected network of “national entrepreneurs.” [9]

In Hungary, that boss was Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán. One month after the election, the new Tisza government introduced legislation on May 12, 2026, to correct the economic policies of the previous regime. Yet, just as scholars warned as early as 2025, the repair costs will be immense, especially regarding the rehabilitation of a healthy business culture. [10]

Looking back at the humorous story from decades ago, one can only hope that Việt Nam’s leaders will seriously reflect on the sharp observation of the Hungarian proverb and the self-deprecating wisdom of Nguyễn Duy Trinh. It would be wise to learn from both Orbán’s failed private-sector development strategy in Hungary and one’s own past mistakes.

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Nguyễn Quang A wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 12, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.