The Legal Questions that Remain in Nguyễn Sỹ Cương’s Exemption

It took more than a year after the crash and nearly a month of intense social media scrutiny for authorities to address the public. Hà Nội police finally spoke: Nguyễn Sỹ Cương caused a fatal crash but was exempted from criminal liability under “proper procedure.” [1] [2] [3] 

While the police have explained the grounds for their conclusion, this answer has only raised a host of other legal questions. 

Police Justification

To understand the authorities’ reasoning for exempting Nguyễn Sỹ Cương from criminal liability, one must first examine Clause 3, Article 29 of the current Penal Code: [4]

“A person who commits an unintentional serious offense or a less serious offense that causes harm to another person’s life, health, honor, dignity, or property may be exempted from criminal liability if that person voluntarily repairs or compensates for the damage or remedies the consequences and if the victim or the victim’s legal representative voluntarily reconciles and requests the exemption.”

When comparing the narrative released by Hà Nội police with this provision, the details align almost perfectly. [5]

Investigators determined that Cương drove in the wrong lane and on the wrong part of the road, causing a fatal crash. This violates Clause 1, Article 260 of the Penal Code, which is classified as a serious offense. However, investigators also reported that Cương made a truthful confession, actively remedied the consequences, and secured a formal exemption request from the victim’s family. Hence, the police concluded that he qualified for the exemption.

To reinforce their decision, police noted that Cương had no alcohol in his system and held a valid driver’s license. While these are not explicitly required under Clause 3, Article 29, they are important for determining his sentencing range under Article 260. If his conduct fell under Clause 2, Article 260—which carries a prison sentence of three to 10 years and is deemed a very serious offense—he would be ineligible for an exemption under Clause 3, Article 29.

Public Debate on Intentionality 

The justification provided by Hà Nội police has prompted widespread debate, with nearly every link in their chain of reasoning drawing public skepticism.

The primary dispute centers on whether an offense under Clause 1, Article 260 qualifies as an unintentional serious offense. Atty. Trần Đại Lâm, among others, has stated that the provision involves unintentional fault [6]; however, journalist Đoàn Bảo Châu has argued that Nguyễn Sỹ Cương acted intentionally when committing the traffic violation. [7]

An anonymous criminal law expert told Luật Khoa that while the offense under Article 260 is categorized as unintentional, it theoretically involves “mixed fault.” This means that the physical conduct is intentional, but the perpetrator is unintentional regarding the fatal consequences. 

The expert explained that if Cương had intended the consequences, the act would constitute murder rather than a mere traffic violation. Hence, the expert concluded that the police’s application of Clause 3, Article 29, was appropriate.

This interpretation aligns with a 2018 statement from Phạm Thị Bích Ngọc, now the deputy director of the Supreme People’s Court’s Department of Judicial Review and Inspection. She said, “The fault element in the offense of violating regulations on operating road vehicles must be unintentional, either through overconfidence or carelessness.” [8]

Ngọc agreed that offenders falling within the basic sentencing range could be considered for an exemption if they provide compensation and secure a reconciliation request from the victim’s family. However, she emphasized that such exemptions should not apply when the offender is entirely at fault and the violation results in death.

The Questioning of Clause 2

While police presented circumstances designed to place Cương’s conduct under Clause 1, Article 260—a necessary condition for the Clause 3, Article 29 exemption—the public remains skeptical.

Citizens have scrutinized the authorities’ narrative, questioning the timing of the sample collection, Cương’s address, and the cause of the crash. [9] Their suspicions only deepened when Việt Nam Television quietly deleted its initial reports, blurred related documents, and then reposted altered content.

More importantly, the public has identified unresolved details that could push Cương’s conduct into the aggravated sentencing range, thereby voiding his eligibility for exemption.

Initial reports noted that the crash killed a female student and broke her father’s leg. [10] Under Point E, Clause 2, Article 260, Cương would face the aggravated range and lose his exemption eligibility if his actions “caused injury or harm to the health of two or more people, with a combined bodily injury rate of 122% to 200%.” 

To date, the father’s official bodily injury rate has not been disclosed.

Furthermore, there are lingering questions regarding Cương’s immediate post-crash actions. Whether he remained at the scene to assist the victims is both a moral and legal question. If evidence demonstrates that Cương “fled to evade responsibility or deliberately failed to assist a victim” as defined by Point C, Clause 2, Article 260, he would be ineligible for the Clause 3, Article 29 exemption.

Was a Criminal Case Opened?

Beyond the conditions for exemption, another procedural question remains: Did investigators ever formally open a criminal case? According to several lawyers, answering this is essential to evaluating the claim made by the Hà Nội police that Cương was exempted under “proper procedure.” [11]

Speaking to Luật Khoa, an experienced lawyer emphasized that authorities must disclose whether a criminal case was initiated according to required protocols, adding that this information remains opaque despite the public’s right to know.

Currently, Hà Nội police have only stated that Cương violated Clause 1, Article 260, and qualified for an exemption. They have not clarified if a formal decision to open a case was ever issued. This distinction is important, as declining to open a case and exempting someone from criminal liability are legally separate matters. Under Article 157 of the Criminal Procedures Code, an exemption from criminal liability is not a valid ground for declining to initiate criminal proceedings. [12]

While police concluded that Cương’s actions violated Clause 1, Article 260, the subsequent procedural steps remain unexplained. The public remains entirely in the dark about when Cương was exempted, which agency authorized the decision, and what specific process was followed. 

Until authorities disclose these details, their assertion of following “proper procedure” merely states an outcome without proving how it was achieved.

The Discretionary “May”

Assuming for a moment that all previous disputes are set aside and Nguyễn Sỹ Cương fully satisfied the exemption conditions under Clause 3, Article 29, the statutory use of the word “may” remains a point of contention.

Unlike Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 29, Clause 3 does not mandate that a person who commits an unintentional serious offense, compensates the victim, and secures a reconciliation request “shall be exempted.” It only states that the offender “may be exempted.” According to a criminal law expert, this specific phrasing establishes a discretionary rather than mandatory exemption.

However, another lawyer consulting with Luật Khoa argued that the provision is not necessarily discretionary but lacks practical application guidelines:

“When handling a case, many factors must be considered: whether the offense was intentional or unintentional, whether it resulted from a lack of understanding, whether the defendant is remorseful, whether the defendant is the family’s primary breadwinner, and so on,” the lawyer explained.

“The same is true in every country. Sentences are weighed carefully, and no textbook can list every factor, so clear bodies of precedent develop. The word ‘may,’ for example, appears in statutes. But over a long period of application, precedents establish when it means ‘may’ and when it does not. People can then compare a case with precedent and immediately understand when the provision applies and when it does not. Legal scholarship in Việt Nam generally has much room for improvement.”

Regardless of the interpretation, the phrasing raises a critical issue: What specific criteria determine why one person receives an exemption while another in similar circumstances does not? This concern is well-documented, with judges and prosecutors previously warning that the lack of detailed guidance on Clause 3, Article 29, invites inconsistent application of the law. [13]

As a result, the public debate extends far beyond whether Cương met the basic legal conditions. The prevailing question is this: If the driver had been an ordinary citizen rather than former National Assembly deputy Nguyễn Sỹ Cương—husband to Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Lâm Thị Phương Thanh—would the outcome have been the same? [14]

This is not a hypothetical concern. Numerous published judgments reveal that ordinary citizens who violated Clause 1, Article 260, fully remedied the consequences, and obtained victim exemption requests were still convicted.

---

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on August 22, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine translated it into English.