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The seizure of power by the Myanmar military junta in February 2021 unleashed a brutal nationwide campaign of oppression, encompassing intensified physical violence and a sophisticated strategy of digital repression. According to a press release dated Sept. 9, 2025, from Justice For Myanmar (JFM), this "digital terror campaign" hinges on the collaboration between the junta and the Chinese company Geedge Networks, which is implementing a commercialized version of the " Great Firewall. ”

However, the success of this surveillance state largely depends on domestic telecommunications infrastructure and financial channels—most prominently, the mobile network operator Mytel, which is inextricably linked to the Vietnamese nation and military via Viettel. At its core, this partnership is a cold-blooded transaction where immense financial gains are traded for the active enablement of an authoritarian regime’s war crimes.

The Foundation of Digital Terror The military junta’s objective is to maintain control through fear, censorship, and pervasive surveillance. A key part of this strategy has been to create an internet environment so restrictive that Freedom House's 2024 Freedom on the Net report ranked Myanmar as “Not Free” with a score of only 8/100.

To facilitate this control, the junta utilizes technology supplied by Geedge Networks, a Chinese state-linked company. According to JFM’s report, Silk Road of Surveillance , Geedge Networks is also exporting a sophisticated surveillance and censorship system to Myanmar.

The core technology provided by Geedge, which InterSecLab refers to as exporting "digital authoritarianism as a managed service," is the Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG). This system, comparable to the Great Firewall of China, grants the junta unrestricted access to the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar.

The capabilities of this surveillance system are precise and insidiously invasive. According to the JFM press release , “Geedge systems enable the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time….” This allows the junta to effectively track down, arrest, torture, and kill human rights defenders, journalists, and revolutionary forces across the country.

The surveillance toolkit includes advanced features such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) for the interception of user traffic. The TSG system can also monitor internet and telephone communications. Furthermore, the system allows clients to identify and block Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and circumvention tools like Tor and Psiphon.

According to one document from the Geedge dataset, the junta received a list of 55 priority apps for blocking popular VPNs and the messaging app Signal.

Crucially, this system utilizes a data warehouse solution, TSG Galaxy, which stores records of all TCP, UDP, and SIP sessions. The collected data is accessible through the user interface, Cyber Narrator, which, according to InterSecLab’s analysis , allows government clients to "go back in time" and retroactively identify users—violating the fundamental legal principle of non-retroactivity.

The implementation of this Chinese surveillance technology necessitates the direct and active collaboration of Myanmar's telecommunications providers. According to the JFM report , 13 telecommunications companies in Myanmar are integral to this effort.

These implicated companies, which include ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Myanma Post and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, and Mytel, among others, have installed TSG hardware in their data centers across major cities. As noted in the JFM press release, “By providing hardware, software, and training to the illegal military junta, Geedge and its local collaborators may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity.”

The Việt Nam-Mytel Axis of Control and Commerce Within this network of local collaborators, Mytel occupies a distinct and critical role due to its foreign backing and military integration . The Myanmar military’s actions are primarily driven by " callousness and unending greed. " Mytel is central to monetizing this greed, serving as a lucrative financial channel supported directly by the Vietnamese state.

Mytel, internationally trading as Telecom International Myanmar, is one of four nationwide mobile network operators. Yet, its ownership structure reveals that it is heavily influenced, if not controlled, by the governments and militaries of both Việt Nam and Myanmar.

The majority shareholder of Mytel is Việt Nam's state-owned enterprise, Viettel, which has direct ties to both the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Ministry of Defense. The Myanmar military’s control is channeled through the conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which publicly owns 28% (effectively up to 39%) of Mytel’s shares. The remaining 49% profit share—the largest—goes to Viettel Global JSC, and ultimately to Việt Nam’s Ministry of Defense.

Viettel’s involvement is far from passive. Viettel was " essential in the establishment of Mytel itself, " providing the majority of the $1.38 billion needed in Mytel's first three years through $169 million in shares and up to $903 million in loans.

This financial arrangement is enormously profitable for the military. According to JFM claims , generals involved may be entitled to more than $700 million after five to nine years of Mytel’s operation. These profits are often hidden through proxy shareholders and military shell companies.

Viettel has also been actively aiding the modernization of Myanmar’s military by providing equipment and training. This action indicates that the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, a foreign government entity, is complicit in the multitude of war crimes committed by the Myanmar military.

Mytel’s infrastructure is not only used for digital tracking but is also physically integrated into the junta’s terror campaign. Mytel places its towers inside military bases in ethnic areas without the consent of local communities. The resulting infrastructure enables the military to conduct constant surveillance, torture, and extrajudicial killings in townships like Ann, Kengtung, and Lashio, and has been utilized to aid in the oppression of the Rohingya.

A JFM spokesperson, Yadanar Maung, stated : "Every phone call on the Mytel network and every kilobyte of data finances the people’s oppression."

Mytel’s Digital Complicity Mytel's central role is confirmed by its technical involvement with Geedge Networks. According to the JFM report , Mytel is one of the companies that has implemented Geedge systems in its Yangon and Mandalay data centers.

Leaked correspondence from April 2024 confirms that Mytel experienced network disruptions related to the "secure web gateway system project" (SWG), requiring a meeting between NCSC staff and Mytel's technicians to resolve the issue. This confirms Mytel's necessary role in maintaining the surveillance infrastructure.

It is also worth noting that another Vietnamese state-owned enterprise is implicated : StreamNet, an ISP that implemented TSG in its Yangon data center. StreamNet is reported to be a “joint venture” between the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT), a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise, and Elite Telecom. VNPT previously signed a memorandum of understanding with an arms broker company to provide communications technology services.

A Blueprint for Authoritarian Collaboration The Myanmar junta’s digital terror campaign is a blatant example of transnational authoritarian collaboration, linking Chinese surveillance technology with the financial and infrastructural complicity of Việt Nam’s state-owned military enterprises. Việt Nam’s role, channeled through Viettel and Mytel, is essential to the ongoing repression.

The relationship between the Myanmar military, Mytel, and Viettel is a toxic symbiosis fueled by corruption and control. By investing heavily and maintaining a 49% stake in Mytel, Viettel provides the financial support and technological modernization the Myanmar military desperately needs. The massive profits from this collusion then flow back into the coffers of the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, incentivizing this partnership regardless of the human rights cost.

This support serves as the foundation for the digital weapons supplied by Geedge Networks. Mytel’s data centers transform the network Viettel helped build into the very platform used for mass surveillance.

Viettel and Mytel provide the system’s capacity and infrastructure; Geedge provides the cutting-edge tools for DPI and real-time tracking.

The actions of these entities have severe legal consequences, and Geedge may be guilty of aiding, abetting, and enabling crimes against humanity. Similarly, the involvement of the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense through Viettel renders the Vietnamese government complicit in war crimes.

Justice For Myanmar demands strong action, calling for sanctions against Geedge Networks and an international criminal investigation. Furthermore, JFM specifically demands targeted sanctions on "Junta-owned and linked companies that collaborate in surveillance and censorship, prioritizing Telecom International Myanmar, the operator of Mytel."

The struggle for freedom in Myanmar is a battle against transnational authoritarian interests, where digital repression is sustained by a calculated and callous global market that profits from human rights violations. Việt Nam, through its state-owned military enterprise, plays a direct, insidious, and deeply ingrained role in this campaign of digital terror.

References: Freedom House. (2024, October). Freedom on the Net 2024: The Struggle for Trust Online. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/FREEDOM-ON-THE-NET-2024-DIGITAL-BOOKLET.pdf Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 28). Myanmar: Year of Brutality in Coup's Wake. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/28/myanmar-year-brutality-coups-wake InterSecLab. (2025, September). The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes. https://interseclab.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Internet-Coup_September2025.pdf Justice For Myanmar. (2020, December 20). Nodes of Corruption, Lines of Abuse: How Mytel, Viettel and a global network of businesses support the international crimes of the Myanmar military. https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/nodes-of-corruption-lines-of-abuse-how-mytel-viettel-and-a-global-network-of-businesses-support-the-international-crimes-of-the-myanmar-military Justice For Myanmar. (2020, December). Nodes of Corruption, Lines of Abuse. https://jfm-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/public/JFM_Nodes_of_Corruption_high_res.pdf Justice For Myanmar. (2025, May 24). Companies in ASEAN fuelling Myanmar junta's international crimes. https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/companies-in-asean-fuelling-myanmar-juntas-international-crimes Justice For Myanmar. (2025, September 9). Report reveals how China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecoms companies are enabling the illegal junta's digital terror campaign. https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/report-reveals-how-chinas-geedge-networks-and-myanmar-telecoms-companies-are-enabling-the-illegal-juntas-digital-terror-campaign Justice For Myanmar. (2025, September). Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China’s Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta’s digital terror campaign. https://jfm-files.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/public/Silk+Road+of+Surveillance+EN.pdf Justice For Myanmar. (n.d.). China’s Geedge Networks enabling junta’s digital terror campaign . Retrieved September 22, 2025, from https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5e691d0b7de02f1fd6919876/68bf91a41d90efd6f9af2827_China’s%20Geedge%20Networks%20enabling%20junta’s%20digital%20terror%20campaign%20EN.pdf Reed A. (2021, February). Vietnam-Myanmar, A Tale Of Two Systems: The Takeover Of Telecommunications By Authoritarian Governments And The Military. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/02/vietnam-myanmar-a-tale-of-two-systems-the-takeover-of-telecommunications-by-authoritarian-governments-and-the-military Reed A. (2021, March 24). Oppression Through Greed: What The Myanmar Military And Vietnam Stand To Gain. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/03/oppression-through-greed-what-the-myanmar-military-and-vietnam-stand-to-gain Yang, J. (2025, September). Inside China's Surveillance and Propaganda Industries: Where Profit Meets Party. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/inside-chinas-surveillance-and-propaganda-industries-where-profit-meets-party

The Digital Lifeline: How Việt Nam Abets the Myanmar Junta’s Digital Terror Campaign

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