The Vietnamese government applies a clear double standard to the concept of a “political prisoner.”
On one hand, when the international community calls for the release of prisoners of conscience, authorities consistently insist that Việt Nam has no political prisoners, claiming they only hold individuals who have violated the law. [1] On the other hand, the government describes communists imprisoned by the French colonial administration or the Republic of Việt Nam as exactly that: “political prisoners.”
However, the controversy surrounding this term has never been merely a linguistic dispute.
Defining the Political Prisoner
Who qualifies as a political prisoner?
According to political philosopher Renzo Llorente, a person remains a political prisoner even if they are convicted on ordinary criminal charges, as long as the true motive behind the prosecution serves a political objective. [2]
If the ultimate goal is to silence dissent, suppress challenges to power, or protect the legitimacy of the ruling system, applying a criminal charge does not change the inherently political nature of the imprisonment.
This dynamic is particularly striking in the context of Việt Nam.
State media rarely describe the individuals that the international community and independent observers regard as political prisoners or dissidents. [3] Instead, they are portrayed as regular criminals prosecuted under provisions like Article 117 or Article 331 of the Penal Code. [4]
The former criminalizes “making, storing, distributing, or propagandizing information … against the State,” while the latter targets “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State …”
These legal provisions frequently appear in cases involving public policy criticism, speech, writing, or civil society advocacy. By utilizing this legal framing, the state maintains its narrative that it only imprisons lawbreakers, not political opponents. Yet, based on Llorente’s framework, anyone incarcerated by Vietnamese authorities for political motives is a political prisoner, no matter what criminal label the state applies to them.
A History of Selective Terminology
The Vietnamese government does not completely reject the concept of the political prisoner; rather, it applies the term selectively. State media continues to label past communists who resisted what they viewed as an unjust power structure as “political prisoners.” [5]
If we applied this standard to the present day, we would see undeniable parallels. While those arrested today do not necessarily pursue communist ideals, they are similarly viewed as threats to the ruling order for criticizing policy, advocating for institutional reform and freedom of association, or questioning the organization of state power.
Across eras, the common denominator remains the same: individuals are deprived of their liberty because their actions or speech threaten the existing power structure.
The designation of “political prisoner” in Việt Nam depends entirely on which ideology achieves official orthodoxy. Historical communists are honored because their ideology established the current state’s legitimacy, whereas modern detainees are dismissed as “law violators” for opposing the prevailing political order. Both groups challenged the status quo; the only difference is that official history validated one side while marginalizing the other.
Denying the Concept to Deny Dissent
Why does the government refuse to acknowledge the existence of political prisoners in Việt Nam at all costs?
Labeling someone a “political prisoner” does more than describe their incarceration; it carries a deeper recognition that the individual was arrested for pursuing a political alternative to the ruling authorities.
If the state were to accept this label, it would be forced to acknowledge the presence of genuine societal disagreements regarding the model of power, the political system, and the direction of the country.
This is precisely the scenario the authorities wish to avoid.
Under Việt Nam’s Constitution, which formally enshrines the leadership role of the Communist Party of Việt Nam in Article 4, recognizing political opposition transcends mere terminology. It strikes directly at the foundation of the system’s legitimacy. [6]
For a state prioritizing political unity and stability above all else, such an acknowledgment remains nearly impossible to accept.
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It is difficult to predict when the Vietnamese government will finally acknowledge that individuals imprisoned for political dissent are, in fact, political prisoners. If that day ever arrives, it will signal a shift far more profound than a mere change in terminology. It will mark the moment the state begins to accept and listen to its people, even when their voices challenge those in power.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 24, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. “Vietnam Has No ‘Prisoners of Conscience.’” (March 25, 2019). Quoc Phong Thu Do Online Newspaper. https://qptd.vn/quoc-phong-an-ninh/dau-tranh-chong-dien-bien-hoa-binh/viet-nam-khong-co-tu-nhan-luong-tam-.html
2. Llorente, R. (2016). The Concept of “Political Prisoner”: A Critique. Criminal Justice Ethics, 35(3), 249–267. https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.2016.1249626
3. Free Vietnam’s Political Prisoners! (2026, January 5). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2026/01/05/free-vietnams-political-prisoners
4. thuvienphapluat.vn. (2026, February 23). 2015 Penal Code. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT; thuvienphapluat.vn. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Trach-nhiem-hinh-su/Bo-luat-hinh-su-2015-296661.aspx
5. Truyền. (May 3, 2025). Prime minister: Former political prisoners always keep the bright flame of revolution in their hearts. Báo và Phát thanh, Truyền hình Thanh Hóa. https://baothanhhoa.vn/thu-tuong-cuu-tu-chinh-tri-luon-giu-trong-tim-ngon-lua-cach-mang-sang-ngoi-247575.htm6. thuvienphapluat.vn. (2025, June 16). 2013 Constitution. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT; thuvienphapluat.vn. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hien-phap-nam-2013-215627.aspx









