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As the former right-hand man to the late General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng during the eight-year “đốt lò” (“blazing furnace”) anti-corruption campaign, President Tô Lâm now walks a tightrope as he attempts to manage this complex political legacy.

In Việt Nam, corruption is an everyday affair. It is so commonplace that it has become a weary refrain; everyone knows about it and complains about it, yet it persists. However, whenever people discuss politics, they inevitably bring up corruption because the issue extends far beyond mere financial gain . [1]

It is not just about officials bribing one another, individuals lobbying for promotions, or public funds being siphoned off. More broadly, corruption involves the abuse of power for factional infighting and personal gain. [2]

Within authoritarian countries, corruption often serves as a political instrument that allows the winning faction to consolidate power and purge rivals in pursuit of broader political goals. [3] This hidden dimension makes observing corruption incredibly revealing.

About half a month before the first session of the 16th National Assembly, the Communist Party urgently convened its Second Central Committee Plenum. Much of the surrounding discussion focused on the need to finalize senior personnel appointments before submitting names to the National Assembly for approval. Yet, there was another equally important matter: Tô Lâm’s desire to “ properly reposition ” the Party’s anti-corruption work. [4]

The public learned very little about this major event, which is typical for Central Committee meetings. State media began reporting on a major new policy decision regarding anti-corruption only recently, after Tô Lâm took the oath of office and assumed the presidency.

Although signed on April 1, Resolution 04 was only just revealed to the public. [5] The document is not merely intended to continue the 20-year implementation of Central Resolution 03 on anti-corruption. Instead, it is meant to “reposition,” in Tô Lâm’s own words, these efforts for a “new era.”

Protection Over Persecution

Resolution 04 is an eight-page document that goes beyond merely fighting corruption; it actively seeks to quietly shield officials who are willing to execute their duties.

The Party directs that anti-corruption efforts must “both resolutely and persistently combat corruption, while also fostering development, encouraging and protecting innovative individuals who dare to think, dare to act, for the common good.” (Article 2.2)

While authorities must ensure that enforcement is “strict and timely,” they must also “consider the specific historical context, taking into account political, economic, social effectiveness, and national and ethnic interests in order to handle cases appropriately.” (Article 2.4)

Looking ahead, the Party mandates revisions to institutions and laws, such as the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, specifically aimed at “exempting, reducing, or excluding criminal liability” for corruption-related violations.

The Party explicitly requires a reduction of “criminal liability and penalties” for offenders who “lack profit-driven motives,” or who proactively pay fines and surrender assets. Moving forward, prison terms should be reduced wherever possible, administrative fines should be increased, and prison sentences for “economic and official-duty crimes” must be cut. (Section II, Point 2)

Ultimately, the Party emphasizes the necessity to “complete mechanisms to encourage and protect dynamic, innovative officials who dare to think, dare to act, and dare to take responsibility for the common good.” (Section II, Point 2)

Ensuring System Functionality

The primary reason for this new protective stance is to keep the state apparatus functioning. The anti-corruption drive spearheaded by the late General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng , known as the “blazing furnace,” is one of his major legacies. [6] While the campaign achieved certain successes, it also produced the enormous side effect of paralyzing parts of the government.

For years, the “ blazing furnace ” campaign publicly disciplined, expelled, and prosecuted a long list of state officials, including senior leaders. Consequently, the remaining officials grew increasingly cautious and fearful. [7] Even former Politburo member Đinh La Thăng , once a vastly powerful figure, received a 30-year prison sentence . [8]

Naturally, no one wants to lead an agency and bear ultimate responsibility only to face discipline and imprisonment. This cautious mentality persisted, compounded by the fact that Trọng’s successor, Tô Lâm, was the former minister of public security and the chief executor of the anti-corruption campaign from 2016 until Trọng’s death in 2024.

Upon taking over as General Secretary in August 2024, Tô Lâm established different ambitions. He envisions double-digit economic growth, robust science and technology development, and over $1.4 trillion in investment to propel Việt Nam into a “new era of rising.”

While the realization of these goals remains uncertain, Tô Lâm’s political determination is evident. Many observers view appointing Lê Minh Hưng —the sole Politburo member with finance and economics expertise—as prime minister as a key component of this strategy. [9]

To achieve such growth, Tô Lâm requires a highly determined political system that “focuses only on doing, not on hesitating.” However, because determination does not automatically equal execution, he must address the crippling caution left behind by the “blazing furnace” era.

Resolution 04 serves as his solution. It sends a definitive message to all levels of government that times have changed and that they can now do their jobs safely. The planned legal reforms, the maximum reduction of criminal penalties, the expansion of administrative fines, and the focus on remedying consequences are all reflections of this overarching political goal.

Protection and Purge

While General Secretary Tô Lâm understandably desires a smoothly functioning political system to drive economic growth, that is not the entire story. Beyond shifting toward lighter punishments, the most crucial element of Resolution 04 is a classification system that divides offenders into two distinct categories for different treatment.

The first group includes those who “dare to think, dare to act”—officials who engage in corruption but “without profit-driven motives.” The second group encompasses those involved in “corruption, wastefulness, and negativity"; individuals who “shift responsibility, evade responsibility, and fear responsibility"; and those tied to “interest groups.”

The Party—led by Tô Lâm—dictates this classification. It is evident that the first group comprises individuals aligned with Tô Lâm’s political circle and intentions; they are to be “protected” and granted “lighter penalties” for violations. Conversely, the second group contains opponents, dissenters, and those outside his faction. These individuals are the ones who “deal with” anti-corruption, effectively transforming it into a political instrument.

The “blazing furnace” campaign continues to burn fiercely under Tô Lâm. Since the beginning of this year alone, more than 4,700 defendants and suspects have been prosecuted for corruption-related, economic, and official-duty crimes. [10]

A prominent example is the case involving the Airports Corporation of Vietnam, which is directly linked to the massive Long Thành International Airport project. While lacking the blockbuster mega-cases of the Nguyễn Phú Trọng era, the sheer volume of prosecutions remains highly significant.

Anti-corruption remains a highly effective political tool in the Tô Lâm era. Through Resolution 04, he encourages officials to act boldly to maintain systemic momentum, while simultaneously wielding anti-corruption policies for power control.

As party institutions and Tô Lâm himself increasingly concentrate power, the already fragile mechanisms for checks and balances continue to weaken. There is little reason to believe this campaign is about substantively combating corruption; rather, it remains a viral instrument for Tô Lâm to maintain and consolidate power for himself and his allies.

Sa Huỳnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on April 15, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Tan Trung Nguyen (2025, December 11). Revisiting the Việt Á Covid-19 Scandal: Is Corruption Really Just About the Money? The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2025/12/revisiting-the-viet-a-covid-19-scandal-is-corruption-really-just-about-the-money/

2. Trần Bình Thản. (2024, March 2). Three drivers of anti-corruption efforts in Asian countries. Luật Khoa Magazine . https://luatkhoa.com/2024/03/3-dong-co-chong-tham-nhung-o-cac-nuoc-chau-a/

3. Trần Bình Thản. (2024, January 15). Anti-corruption and factional purges in authoritarian regimes. Luật Khoa Magazine . https://luatkhoa.com/2024/01/chong-tham-nhung-va-thanh-trung-phe-phai-trong-cac-che-do-doc-tai/

4. baochinhphu.vn. (2026, March 23). Opening remarks by General Secretary Tô Lâm at the second plenum of the 14th Party Central Committee. Baochinhphu.vn . https://baochinhphu.vn/phat-bieu-khai-mac-cua-tong-bi-thu-to-lam-tai-hoi-nghi-trung-uong-lan-thu-2-khoa-xiv-10226032310032866.htm

5. Resolution No. 04-NQ/TW: Continuing to strengthen the Party’s leadership over anti-corruption, wastefulness, and negative practices in the new phase. (2026). Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee . https://mattran.org.vn/chuong-trinh-phoi-hop/nghi-quyet-so-04nqtw-tiep-tuc-tang-cuong-su-lanh-dao-cua-dang-doi-voi-cong-tac-phong-chong-tham-nhung-lang-phi-tieu-cuc-trong-giai-doan-moi-70118.html

6. Trần Phương. (2024, July 19). Nguyễn Phú Trọng: A lifetime guarding the Party and fueling the “blazing furnace.” Luật Khoa Magazine . https://luatkhoa.com/2024/07/nguyen-phu-trong-mot-doi-gac-den-va-dot-lo/

7. See [6]

8. Việt Dũng. (2021, March 16). Why Đinh La Thăng received additional sentences but still serves a total of 30 years in prison. Lao Động (laodong.vn) . https://laodong.vn/phap-luat/vi-sao-ong-dinh-la-thang-them-an-ma-van-chiu-tong-cong-30-nam-tu-giam-889647.ldo

9. Lê Sáng. (2026, April 7). Lê Minh Hưng Elected as Prime Minister of Việt Nam . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/le-minh-hung-elected-as-prime-minister-of-viet-nam/

10. Thạch Hãn. (2026, March 19). Continuing the “blazing furnace”: In just over three months, 2,367 people were prosecuted for corruption, economic, and office-related crimes. Luật Khoa Magazine . https://luatkhoa.com/2026/03/tiep-tuc-dot-lo-chi-hon-ba-thang-2-367-nguoi-bi-khoi-to-lien-quan-den-tham-nhung-kinh-te-chuc-vu/