Become a Member for $9.99/month

On every major national holiday, thousands of prisoners are released before completing their sentences. However, the selection process, the exclusions, and the overall transparency of the system are rarely examined systematically.

The latest cycle began on April 7, when Party General Secretary and President Tô Lâm launched the 2026 amnesty campaign by signing Decision No. 457/QĐ-CTN, setting the official release ceremony for June 1. [1]

This action is not an ordinary judicial decision.

According to the 2013 Constitution of Việt Nam and the 2018 Amnesty Law, granting amnesty is a constitutional power vested directly in the state president. [2] It is a personal authority exercised entirely outside the judicial process and without judicial review.

This form of individual early release differs fundamentally from a general amnesty, which requires National Assembly approval and has not been applied since 1975. Therefore, amnesty exists outside standard judicial logic, operating without an adversarial process, appeals, or an independent oversight mechanism.

The 2026 amnesty follows five main steps:

April 7: The decision that launches the process is signed.

During April: Candidate files are reviewed by prison camps and local authorities.

May 27–28: Final lists are completed and submitted for approval.

May 30: The official list is announced.

June 1: Prisoner releases occur nationwide.

Contrary to expectations of a more relaxed policy, the criteria for this round have been tightened. Minimum time-served requirements are stricter, and the list of excluded offenses has expanded, particularly for crimes related to national security.

Clear on Paper, Murky in Practice

Legally, eligibility for amnesty extends to prisoners serving fixed-term sentences, individuals with commuted life sentences, and those temporarily suspended from serving time. The criteria require that convicted persons demonstrate good rehabilitation, avoid falling into excluded categories, and serve a specific portion of their sentence—at least one-third for fixed-term imprisonment or at least 14 years for commuted life sentences.

These excluded categories, listed in Article 10 of the 2018 Amnesty Law, notably bar organized crime offenders, dangerous repeat offenders, and individuals convicted of treason, terrorism, and offenses against national security.

Because the 2026 decision retains and expands upon these exclusions, the chances of clemency for prisoners of conscience—as defined by international human rights organizations—have become exceedingly remote, regardless of their conduct in prison.

The problem lies not in the written criteria, but in their application. The selection process filters through multiple levels, from prison camps to the Ministry of Public Security, and finally to the Amnesty Advisory Council. However, it completely lacks an independent review mechanism at every stage:

No hearings;

No participation by defense lawyers;

No right to appeal denied applications.

As a result, seemingly straightforward standards like “good rehabilitation” or “serious disciplinary violations” remain highly subjective. This leaves substantial room for discretionary decision-making without any independent procedural oversight.

The Three Functions of Amnesty

In practice, Việt Nam’s amnesty system operates on three distinct levels:

Humanitarian: It reduces prison overcrowding and provides rehabilitated individuals with opportunities to successfully reintegrate into society.

Political Symbolism: Timed with major holidays, these amnesties allow the state to project an image of clemency, reinforcing the narrative of a compassionate and stable government.

Diplomacy: The strategic release, or targeted retention, of specific prisoners often acts as a diplomatic signal or a bargaining tool in negotiations with foreign partners.

Questionable Cases

The actual operation of the amnesty system reveals that statutory criteria are not the only determining factors.

The early release of Trần Huỳnh Duy Thức—freed eight months before his sentence concluded—was widely interpreted as a calculated diplomatic gesture. His release occurred just one day prior to Tô Lâm’s September 2024 visit to the United States, coinciding with mounting US criticism of Việt Nam’s human rights record. [3]

Similarly, the 2018 release of blogger and activist Nguyễn Ngọc Như Quỳnh, who was convicted under Article 88 of the Penal Code, bypassed formal amnesty altogether. Driven by international pressure, she was effectively expelled and subsequently sought political asylum in the United States. [4] Her situation highlights a parallel "exit route" distinct from official channels, typically reserved for prisoners of conscience when external diplomatic pressure peaks.

In contrast, figures implicated in anti-corruption sweeps, like Đinh La Thăng, remain absent from official amnesty rosters despite theoretically meeting eligibility requirements for a 30-year sentence. Yet, Thăng was later seen in photographs with friends during the Lunar New Year. [5] Reportedly released ahead of schedule around Sept. 2 last year, his absence from public registries raises serious questions regarding "unannounced amnesty."

While these cases do not definitively prove systemic arbitrariness, they strongly indicate that unwritten political considerations play a pivotal role in how amnesty operates in practice.

Humanitarianism or Fairness

Amnesty is generally regarded as a humanitarian policy and an expression of legal clemency. However, every round of sentence reductions and early releases revives a familiar debate: Who truly benefits, and are the selection criteria applied equally?

In recent years, whenever these decisions are announced, public attention has increasingly focused not just on the sheer number of prisoners released but on the specific composition of those beneficiaries.

If this policy truly grounds itself in humanitarian principles, it must be transparent and consistent. Without them, the public may perceive that opportunities for “clemency” depend entirely on a prisoner's political standing or circumstances. The core issue is not whether amnesty should exist, but rather how it is executed and who holds the authority to oversee it.

A Transparency Gap

In legal systems with functioning checks on power, the discretionary nature of amnesty decisions often sparks controversy. However, the press can typically question these decisions, legal counsel can challenge them, and courts can review them. In Việt Nam, nearly all such layers of scrutiny completely disappear.

Because amnesty decisions are final, those excluded from the release lists have no right to learn the reasoning behind their denial. Furthermore, the public lacks access to the data necessary to evaluate consistency across different cases, and there is no independent oversight body monitoring the process. Without such transparency, people can easily perceive even a policy rooted in humanitarianism as a tool for distributing privilege.

Despite this opacity, one notable development is the recent credit assistance program for former prisoners. Reports indicate that nearly 15,000 individuals have accessed loan programs totaling roughly 1.3 trillion đồng (about $50 million USD) to support production, business activities, and post-release reintegration. [6]

While the amount is a significant figure, practical questions remain regarding true accessibility. Is the program actually reaching those who are genuinely struggling, or does it merely benefit individuals who already possess collateral and adequate credit histories?

Because independent evaluation reports on this issue remain notably absent, even progressive policies risk people viewing them as purely symbolic in the absence of genuine transparency.

The Remaining Question

Amnesty itself is not inherently negative. Across many legal systems, it serves as an important mechanism to correct the limitations of rigid laws, remedy failures within the justice system, or respond to extraordinary circumstances that ordinary legislation cannot adequately address.

However, when this power remains personal in nature, completely lacks accountability, and operates entirely without oversight, the public discussion cannot merely stop at the sheer number of released prisoners—especially since these decisions directly dictate the freedom of thousands of people.

Ultimately, the more important question is this: what criteria exclude certain individuals from the amnesty list, and who verifies those decisions?

Thiên Di wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 15, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

1. Vietnam News Agency. (2026, April 9). State President’s amnesty decision in 2026 announced. VietnamPlus. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/state-presidents-amnesty-decision-in-2026-announced-post340796.vnp

2. Quảng Trị Provincial People’s Committee. (2017). Decision No. 3655/QĐ-UBND of 2017 on assigning hospital bed targets to public medical examination and treatment facilities in Quảng Trị Province for the 2018–2020 period. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/The-thao-Y-te/Quyet-dinh-3655-QD-UBND-2017-giao-ke-hoach-giuong-benh-cho-co-so-kham-chua-benh-Quang-Tri-375803.aspx

3. Người Việt. (n.d.). Activist Trần Huỳnh Duy Thức released. https://www.nguoi-viet.com/viet-nam/nha-dau-tranh-tran-huynh-duy-thuc-duoc-tha/

4. Amnesty International. (2018, October 17). Viet Nam: Mother Mushroom’s freedom should spark release of countless more peaceful critics. https://www.amnesty.org.au/viet-nam-mother-mushrooms-freedom-should-spark-release-of-countless-more-peaceful-critics/

5. BBC News Tiếng Việt. (n.d.). Đinh La Thăng “released from prison” and related legal issues. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cjwz67n03pqo

6. Ministry of Industry and Trade. (2026). New provisions on conditions and eligible subjects for special amnesty in 2026. Công Thương. https://congthuong.vn/diem-moi-ve-dieu-kien-va-doi-tuong-dac-xa-nam-2026-451308.html