​Tô Lâm at the Pinnacle of Power: What Comes Next for Việt Nam

​Việt Nam has joined the group of socialist countries where a single leader simultaneously holds the top party and state positions, with Tô Lâm currently wielding both of those “scepters.” 

Following his re-election as general secretary in January 2026 and his election as president in April, observers argue that Tô Lâm possesses greater power than any Vietnamese leader since the era of Lê Duẩn. [1] 

However, examining Vietnamese politics over the past several decades reveals that reaching the summit of power is only the beginning of the process of constructing and maintaining a power structure. 

As a newly ascendant politician, Tô Lâm is no exception.

Adopting “Power Lessons” from China

​Only days after he was elected state president and consolidated the two highest political posts, Tô Lâm traveled to China to meet his counterpart, Xi Jinping. 

During an April 14 speech at Tsinghua University, Tô Lâm stated that Việt Nam “always considers the development of relations with China an objective necessity, a strategic choice, and a top priority.” [2] 

The two countries further distinguished the visit by signing 32 cooperation agreements. Among the most significant were undisclosed agreements that concerned cooperation plans and political alignment between the two communist parties. [3]

​China has long merged the positions of general secretary and president, roles currently held by Xi Jinping. Xi expanded this authority by directing revisions to both the Communist Party charter and the constitution, allowing himself to remain president indefinitely. [4] [5] 

By creating institutional barriers to his replacement, he elevated his power to an unprecedented level. [6] Furthermore, international commentators observe that Xi aspires to increase his personal stature to the level of Mao Zedong. [7] 

This ambition is evidenced by the inclusion of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” in the Chinese constitution [8] and the widespread requirement to read his published political theories in Chinese universities. [9]

Similarly, in Việt Nam, the revision of the Party Charter became an immediate priority following Tô Lâm’s election as general secretary. 

In January, the newly formed 14th Party Central Committee announced plans to amend the Party Charter, the highest internal document of the Communist Party. [10] Such amendments could directly alter the scope, reach, and duration of the general secretary’s authority.

Moreover, Tô Lâm recently established a new Central Theoretical Council for the 2026–2031 term, filling the ideological advisory body with aligned theorists. [11]

​The ideological rhetoric promoted by Tô Lâm since the 14th Party Congress also mirrors Chinese models. His slogan regarding a “new era” for the nation closely resembles the phrase “new era” (新时代) central to Xi Jinping’s ideological framework. [12]

This phrase is paired with the concept of a “new period” (新时期), a term previously introduced during the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party when Xi first assumed power. [13] 

Beyond the Party Charter, the Communist Party under Tô Lâm is actively directing studies into constitutional revisions. The Politburo has already issued conclusions on legislative orientations for the 16th National Assembly, outlining plans for a comprehensive amendment to the constitution, which currently defines the role, responsibilities, and term limits of the presidency. [14]

Preparing for Another Term

​Since Tô Lâm assumed the role of general secretary in 2024, observers have noted the rapid political ascent of officials from his native Hưng Yên Province. [15] 

Following the 14th Party Congress and the first session of the 16th National Assembly, the concentration of key and senior leaders sharing this provincial background has reached unprecedented levels. [16] [17]

Concurrently, Tô Lâm has repeatedly emphasized stronger Party control over power. He argues that cadre work is the “most crucial of the crucial,” necessitating “extreme thoroughness and precision” in the selection and appointment of senior leaders. [18] [19] 

Tô Lâm has proven highly effective in his personnel arrangements, strategically placing fellow Hưng Yên natives and former subordinates from the Ministry of Public Security into vital positions across the Party and state apparatus. 

This method of preserving authority mirrors the strategies employed for years by leaders in Việt Nam’s fellow socialist states, such as China, North Korea, and Laos. [20] [21] [22]

Expanding the Ministry of Public Security

​For the Hưng Yên-born leader, protecting the Party is synonymous with securing his own political future. 

This awareness has been institutionalized in the security provisions of the 14th Party Congress resolutions, which explicitly define regime security and ruling-party security as the two “core pillars” of the national security system. [23] 

Unlike many political leaders who ascended through local administrations, economic management, or Party committees, Tô Lâm emerged directly from the internal security apparatus. This unique background fundamentally shapes his approach to governance, evidenced by the widening network of security-related laws and the rapid expansion of the security sector under his leadership. [24] 

While the security apparatus was already considered bloated under his predecessor, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, it has grown even further under Tô Lâm. This expansion persists despite his repeated directives to “streamline the apparatus.” In practice, this streamlining campaign has targeted most state institutions with the notable exception of the Ministry of Public Security, whose growing structure and authority highlight the strategic importance of security in his governing vision.

Expanding Influence Over the Military

​Political observers frequently characterize Việt Nam’s military and police as the twin pillars of the Communist Party system and its primary centers of power. 

Professor Carl Thayer of the University of New South Wales in Australia notes that, from a purely institutional perspective, neither force can dominate the other, compelling Tô Lâm to balance their interests to maintain broad consensus. [25]

Recent developments have also indicated that he has effectively accommodated the military, expanding his influence over the institution in the process.

On Jan. 12, Reuters reported that senior military officers agreed to concessions favoring Tô Lâm to preserve their positions, according to two internal sources. [26] 

Prior to the 14th Party Congress, there was public speculation that Defense Minister Phan Văn Giang might challenge Tô Lâm for the general secretaryship.

Ultimately, Tô Lâm secured the post, while Giang was allowed to retain his leadership of the military rather than facing replacement. This balancing act serves as a flexible political maneuver by Tô Lâm to secure his supreme leadership position and broaden his political influence. 

Upon becoming the state president, Tô Lâm automatically assumed the chairmanship of the National Defense and Security Council, the body that oversees all armed forces. By holding the authority to determine military ranks and promote or demote generals, he gained an essential platform to further entrench his influence within the military. 

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Hạo Nam wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.