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Việt Nam has joined the group of socialist countries where a single leader simultaneously holds the top party and state positions, with Tô Lâm currently wielding both of those “scepters.”

Following his re-election as general secretary in January 2026 and his election as president in April, observers argue that Tô Lâm possesses greater power than any Vietnamese leader since the era of Lê Duẩn. [1]

However, examining Vietnamese politics over the past several decades reveals that reaching the summit of power is only the beginning of the process of constructing and maintaining a power structure.

As a newly ascendant politician, Tô Lâm is no exception.

Photo: Andres Martinez Casares/AP.

Adopting “Power Lessons” from China

Only days after he was elected state president and consolidated the two highest political posts, Tô Lâm traveled to China to meet his counterpart, Xi Jinping.

During an April 14 speech at Tsinghua University, Tô Lâm stated that Việt Nam “always considers the development of relations with China an objective necessity, a strategic choice, and a top priority.” [2]

The two countries further distinguished the visit by signing 32 cooperation agreements . Among the most significant were undisclosed agreements that concerned cooperation plans and political alignment between the two communist parties. [3]

China has long merged the positions of general secretary and president, roles currently held by Xi Jinping. Xi expanded this authority by directing revisions to both the Communist Party charter and the constitution, allowing himself to remain president indefinitely . [4] [5]

By creating institutional barriers to his replacement, he elevated his power to an unprecedented level. [6] Furthermore, international commentators observe that Xi aspires to increase his personal stature to the level of Mao Zedong. [7]

This ambition is evidenced by the inclusion of “ Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era ” in the Chinese constitution [8] and the widespread requirement to read his published political theories in Chinese universities. [9]

The book series “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China” has been translated into multiple languages and made mandatory throughout China’s higher education system. Photo source: Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China.

Similarly, in Việt Nam, the revision of the Party Charter became an immediate priority following Tô Lâm’s election as general secretary.

In January, the newly formed 14th Party Central Committee announced plans to amend the Party Charter, the highest internal document of the Communist Party. [10] Such amendments could directly alter the scope, reach, and duration of the general secretary’s authority.

Moreover, Tô Lâm recently established a new Central Theoretical Council for the 2026–2031 term, filling the ideological advisory body with aligned theorists. [11]

The ideological rhetoric promoted by Tô Lâm since the 14th Party Congress also mirrors Chinese models. His slogan regarding a “new era” for the nation closely resembles the phrase “new era” (新时代) central to Xi Jinping’s ideological framework. [12]

This phrase is paired with the concept of a “ new period ” (新时期), a term previously introduced during the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party when Xi first assumed power. [13]

Beyond the Party Charter, the Communist Party under Tô Lâm is actively directing studies into constitutional revisions. The Politburo has already issued conclusions on legislative orientations for the 16th National Assembly, outlining plans for a comprehensive amendment to the constitution, which currently defines the role, responsibilities, and term limits of the presidency. [14]

Preparing for Another Term

Since Tô Lâm assumed the role of general secretary in 2024, observers have noted the rapid political ascent of officials from his native Hưng Yên Province . [15]

Following the 14th Party Congress and the first session of the 16th National Assembly, the concentration of key and senior leaders sharing this provincial background has reached unprecedented levels. [16] [17]

Concurrently, Tô Lâm has repeatedly emphasized stronger Party control over power. He argues that cadre work is the “ most crucial of the crucial, ” necessitating “ extreme thoroughness and precision ” in the selection and appointment of senior leaders. [18] [19]

Tô Lâm has proven highly effective in his personnel arrangements, strategically placing fellow Hưng Yên natives and former subordinates from the Ministry of Public Security into vital positions across the Party and state apparatus.

This method of preserving authority mirrors the strategies employed for years by leaders in Việt Nam’s fellow socialist states, such as China , North Korea , and Laos . [20] [21] [22]

Senior Vietnamese officials (right) meet with Chinese counterparts during Tô Lâm’s state visit. Several figures in the photo are from the Ministry of Public Security, including Hưng Yên natives aligned with Tô Lâm. Photo source: Thống Nhất/Vietnam News Agency.

Expanding the Ministry of Public Security

For the Hưng Yên-born leader, protecting the Party is synonymous with securing his own political future.

This awareness has been institutionalized in the security provisions of the 14th Party Congress resolutions, which explicitly define regime security and ruling-party security as the two “ core pillars ” of the national security system. [23]

Unlike many political leaders who ascended through local administrations, economic management, or Party committees, Tô Lâm emerged directly from the internal security apparatus. This unique background fundamentally shapes his approach to governance, evidenced by the widening network of security-related laws and the rapid expansion of the security sector under his leadership . [24]

While the security apparatus was already considered bloated under his predecessor, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, it has grown even further under Tô Lâm. This expansion persists despite his repeated directives to “streamline the apparatus.” In practice, this streamlining campaign has targeted most state institutions with the notable exception of the Ministry of Public Security, whose growing structure and authority highlight the strategic importance of security in his governing vision.

Expanding Influence Over the Military

Political observers frequently characterize Việt Nam's military and police as the twin pillars of the Communist Party system and its primary centers of power.

Professor Carl Thayer of the University of New South Wales in Australia notes that, from a purely institutional perspective , neither force can dominate the other, compelling Tô Lâm to balance their interests to maintain broad consensus. [25]

Recent developments have also indicated that he has effectively accommodated the military, expanding his influence over the institution in the process.

General Secretary and President Tô Lâm meets with relatives of military officers, experts, and Việt Nam–China friendship figures. Photo: Thống Nhất/Vietnam News Agency.

On Jan. 12, Reuters reported that senior military officers agreed to concessions favoring Tô Lâm to preserve their positions, according to two internal sources . [26]

Prior to the 14th Party Congress, there was public speculation that Defense Minister Phan Văn Giang might challenge Tô Lâm for the general secretaryship.

Ultimately, Tô Lâm secured the post, while Giang was allowed to retain his leadership of the military rather than facing replacement. This balancing act serves as a flexible political maneuver by Tô Lâm to secure his supreme leadership position and broaden his political influence.

Upon becoming the state president, Tô Lâm automatically assumed the chairmanship of the National Defense and Security Council, the body that oversees all armed forces. By holding the authority to determine military ranks and promote or demote generals, he gained an essential platform to further entrench his influence within the military.

Hạo Nam wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 13, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: +

BBC News Vietnamese. (2026, April 9). Tô Lâm’s consolidation of power: How is it different from Xi Jinping’s in China? BBC News Vietnamese. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/clyx4zy11zno

Baochinhphu.vn. (2026, April 14). Full text of General Secretary and State President Tô Lâm’s policy speech at Tsinghua University, China . https://baochinhphu.vn/toan-van-phat-bieu-chinh-sach-cua-tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-nuoc-to-lam-tai-dai-hoc-thanh-hoa-trung-quoc-102260414213817714.htm

Thiên Di. (2026, April 28). Tô Lâm in China: The 32 Secret Agreements Việt Nam Signed . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/to-lam-in-china-the-32-secret-agreements-viet-nam-signed/

孙美真. (2022). Full text of resolution on Party Constitution amendment . Www.Gov.Cn. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202210/22/content_WS6353e0bbc6d0a757729e18c7.html

Xi Jinping’s rule indefinite as China votes to abolish presidential term limits . (2018, March 11). Abc.Net.Au. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-12/china-abolishes-presidential-term-limits/9537166

Reuters. (2022, October 22). China’s Communist Party amends its charter, strengthens Xi’s power . Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-amends-its-charter-strengthens-xi-power-2022-10-22/

NAKAZAWA, K. (2022, September 14). Analysis: Xi prepares to wave magic wand for more power . Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/editor-s-picks/china-up-close/analysis-xi-prepares-to-wave-magic-wand-for-more-power

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era – China Media Project . (2021, April 18). China Media Project. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/xi-jinping-thought-on-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-for-a-new-era/

TheoryChina – Recommended Reading – Fifth volume of “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China” published . (2025). Theorychina.Org.Cn. https://en.theorychina.org.cn/c/2025-07-31/1529805.shtml

Hương Quỳnh, Trần Thường, & Phạm Hải. (2026). Proposal on directions for supplementing and amending the Party Charter immediately after the 14th Party Congress . VietNamNet News. https://vietnamnet.vn/de-xuat-dinh-huong-bo-sung-sua-doi-dieu-le-dang-ngay-sau-dai-hoi-14-2484556.html

Vietnam News Agency – Lý Thường Kiệt, Hanoi. (2026, March 10). Conference announces the establishment of the Central Theoretical Council . People’s Army Newspaper. https://www.qdnd.vn/chinh-tri/tin-tuc/tong-bi-thu-to-lam-chu-tri-hoi-nghi-cong-bo-thanh-lap-hoi-dong-ly-luan-trung-uong-nhiem-ky-2026-2031-1029576

Grzywacz, J. (2023, January 26). How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power . Thediplomat.Com; The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-xi-jinping-used-the-ccp-constitution-to-cement-his-power/

See: http://www.hprc.org.cn/gsyj/xkjs/gsyjff/202409/t20240904_5775742.html

VnExpress. (2026, April 9). Comprehensive constitutional amendment under study . VnExpress. https://vnexpress.net/nghien-cuu-sua-doi-tong-the-hien-phap-5060437.html

Nguyễn Hưng Yên. (2026, March 17). All Roads Lead to Hưng Yên: Power, Policy, and Capital Allocation Under Tô Lâm . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/03/all-roads-lead-to-hung-yen-power-policy-and-capital-allocation-under-to-lam/

See [15]

Lê Sáng. (2026, April 8). Hưng Yên Province Dominates Việt Nam’s New State Leadership Roster . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/hung-yen-province-dominates-viet-nams-new-state-leadership-roster/

Thạch Hãn. (2026, January 26). Việt Nam’s 14th Party Congress Consolidates Power as New Politburo and Secretariat Take Shape . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/viet-nams-14th-party-congress-consolidates-power-as-new-politburo-and-secretariat-take-shape/

Chung, T. (2025, December 22). General Secretary Tô Lâm: The selection of the Party’s highest leadership must be extremely careful and precise . Tuổi Trẻ Online. https://tuoitre.vn/tong-bi-thu-to-lam-chon-nhan-su-ban-lanh-dao-cao-nhat-cua-dang-phai-that-ky-luong-chinh-xac-20251222093115036.htm

Decoding Chinese Politics . (2024, October 4). Asia Society. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics?policy=top-leadership&group=factions&size=rank&connection=personal

Whong, E. (2019, February 22). Report: Kim Jong Un Has Purged a Confirmed 421 Officials . Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nksc-purge-02222019182245.html

Elite family ties still bind the Lao Peoples’ Revolutionary Party . (2021, January 20). East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/01/21/elite-family-ties-still-bind-the-lao-peoples-revolutionary-party/

cand.com.vn. (2026, February 7). Toàn văn chuyên đề “Nhận thức, tư duy mới về an ninh trong Nghị quyết Đại hội XIV của Đảng” – Báo Công an Nhân dân điện tử . Báo Công an Nhân Dân Điện Tử. https://cand.com.vn/su-kien-binh-luan-thoi-su/toan-van-chuyen-de-nhan-thuc-tu-duy-moi-ve-an-ninh-trong-nghi-quyet-dai-hoi-xiv-cua-dang-i796514/

Trường An. (2026, January 5). Việt Nam 2025: The Power Expansion of the Ministry of Public Security . The Vietnamese Magazine. https://thevietnamese.org/2026/01/viet-nam-2025-the-power-expansion-of-the-ministry-of-public-security/

BBC News Vietnamese. (2024, September 9). Ministry of National Defense vs. Ministry of Public Security: The balance of political power . BBC News Vietnamese. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cm2ng9gkxero

Guarascio, F. (2026, January 12). Vietnam’s Communist Party chief Lam seeks presidency in China-style expanded power mandate . Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vietnams-communist-party-chief-lam-seeks-presidency-china-style-expanded-power-2026-01-12/