Nguyễn Tấn Dũng’s Return: Revisiting the ‘Trọng–Dũng Power Struggle’ a Decade Later

On April 6, 2026, former Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng sat in the front row of Diên Hồng Hall alongside incumbent leaders. Noticeably absent was the political rival who once stood opposite him, having already passed away. [1]

After nearly a decade away from the political spotlight, Dũng has started to reappear at major state events following the death of Nguyễn Phú Trọng and the subsequent rise of Tô Lâm.

The date of his return was highly symbolic; exactly ten years earlier, on the afternoon of April 6, 2016, the National Assembly voted to remove Dũng from office. This dismissal ended his nearly ten-year tenure as prime minister and concluded one of the most consequential power struggles in the political history of Việt Nam.

State media at the time downplayed the situation, portraying him as a leader who had fulfilled his duties and framing the departure as a standard high-level personnel restructuring arranged by the party and state. [2]

However, international scholars viewed his removal differently, recognizing it as the climax of a five-year battle between two distinct centers of power: the head of government, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, and the head of the party, Nguyễn Phú Trọng.

While one-party states rarely make internal conflicts public, this specific rivalry provided a rare instance where outside observers could analyze the dynamics with unusual clarity. 

One of the most notable works on this subject is The 2016 Leadership Change in Vietnam and Its Long-Term Implications by Alexander L. Vuving, published by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in 2017, which closely documents the struggle. [3]

A decade later, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng’s reappearance at Diên Hồng Hall offers a rare opportunity to reflect upon the very event that continues to shape the modern political landscape of Việt Nam.

The Anti-Corruption Campaign

From his first year as general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng established party discipline and “purity” as his top priorities. This culminated at the 4th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, where he formally launched a party “rectification” campaign centered squarely on anti-corruption. [4]

According to the research of Alexander L. Vuving, the campaign was not just an internal reform effort. Instead, the campaign was designed to control and weaken vested-interest groups, with then-Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng viewed as their central figure.

Vuving notes that Dũng was not merely the head of government; he served as the nexus of a vast political-economic network where state power and business interests were deeply intertwined.

As such, the conflict between Trọng and Dũng went beyond personal differences or ethics. It reflected a fundamental clash between two distinct leadership styles: one driven by principles, and the other driven by interests.

Escalating the Conflict

Following nearly a year of the party rectification campaign, Nguyễn Phú Trọng initiated his first decisive move against Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. During the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 2012, the Politburo weighed a proposal to discipline Dũng over economic violations.

In a rare occurrence, the Central Committee rejected the major proposal from the Politburo. According to Vuving, this support for Dũng was not purely personal; it stemmed from broader considerations. Members likely viewed his pragmatic, growth-oriented leadership model as a mechanism to preserve the balance of power and provide greater opportunities for themselves.

Rather than facing formal discipline, Dũng simply issued a public apology, accepting responsibility for government management weaknesses and specific economic losses. [5]

Nguyễn Tấn Dũng Gains the Upper Hand

After Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s defeat at the 6th Plenum in 2012, the power struggle entered a new phase of prolonged deadlock, with the scales temporarily tipping in favor of Nguyễn Tấn Dũng.

This shift became glaringly obvious at the 7th Plenum in May 2013. Nguyễn Phú Trọng proposed elevating Nguyễn Bá Thanh and Vương Đình Huệ to the Politburo, but the Central Committee outright rejected his nominations. Instead, the committee elected Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân and Nguyễn Thiện Nhân—figures widely considered “friendly” or less confrontational toward Dũng.

Between 2013 and 2014, several key indicators suggested that Dũng’s power had reached its peak. According to Vuving’s research, Chinese President Xi Jinping even invited Dũng to visit China ahead of the 12th Party Congress. This was a striking move, as standard protocol dictates extending such an invitation to the general secretary, not the prime minister.

Bolstered by his heavy influence within the Central Committee and undeniable international recognition, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng emerged as the leading candidate for the position of general secretary at the 12th Party Congress. However, it was at this point that the tide began to turn.

Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s Trump Card

During the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee in January 2015, Nguyễn Phú Trọng pushed for another vote of no confidence against Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. When the outcome once again fell short of expectations, Trọng’s camp realized that direct confrontation was futile given the strong support of the prime minister within the Central Committee.

Instead, they decided to change the “rules of the game” by introducing Regulation 244 on internal Party elections.

This regulation restricted the rights of Central Committee members to nominate others or themselves, mandating that all candidate lists for the Central Committee receive pre-approval from the Politburo.

This effectively neutralized Dũng’s core advantage. Prior to Regulation 244, he could rely on the Central Committee to maintain his edge. Afterward, the committee lost its independent authority to nominate candidates without Politburo consent—and the Politburo at that time leaned heavily toward Nguyễn Phú Trọng.

According to the study, Regulation 244 enabled the Politburo to control the nomination process, firmly keeping the Central Committee “within its framework.”

The Decisive 13th Plenum

According to Vuving’s research, the outcome of the power struggle between Trọng and Dũng was effectively sealed at the 13th Plenum in December 2015, just five weeks before the 12th Party Congress. Stymied by the constraints of Regulation 244 and mounting personnel disadvantages in the final stages, Dũng faced insurmountable odds in reversing the situation.

Subsequently, the 14th Plenum in January 2016 completed the final steps, officially nominating Nguyễn Phú Trọng to retain his position as general secretary.

Nevertheless, the lingering influence of Nguyễn Tấn Dũng was still apparent at the 12th Party Congress. Despite being excluded from the official candidate list, he secured floor nominations from approximately 20 percent of the delegates—a highly significant figure considering the strict internal restrictions.

Ultimately, this display of support was not enough to change the trajectory. Nguyễn Phú Trọng secured re-election, utilizing a special exemption to bypass the mandatory age limit under party rules, and Nguyễn Tấn Dũng formally withdrew from the political arena.

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The key to Nguyễn Tấn Dũng’s defeat did not stem from weakness, but rather from a level of strength that caused the entire political system to turn against him.

Over the years, Dũng achieved near-unmatched dominance within the apparatus. Widely regarded as the most powerful politician in post-Đổi Mới Việt Nam, he wielded broad influence in the Central Committee and controlled significant economic resources. However, his aggressive exercise of power inevitably triggered massive backlash.

Despite his strong backing within the Central Committee, Dũng lacked meaningful allies in the highest center of power. Research indicates that Nguyễn Thiện Nhân was the only figure within the Politburo at the time to openly support him. 

The deeper cause of his downfall lay in the way Dũng practiced politics. He expanded economic control, intervened deeply in networks of vested interests, and readily pressured his rivals.

As a result, he gradually alienated potential allies while simultaneously creating formidable enemies. Beyond his clash with Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Dũng also came into conflict with Trương Tấn Sang and severely damaged his relationship with Nguyễn Sinh Hùng.

What ultimately unfolded was not a one-on-one contest but the steady formation of a broad, unified coalition against him. By pushing himself out of the established system of power alliances, Dũng engineered his own isolation. As an observation in the study succinctly put it: “He turned almost everyone into an enemy.”

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Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 4, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.