Việt Nam’s 50 Million Đồng Fake News Fine: Police Still Decide the ‘Truth’

The Vietnamese public has long been familiar with the standard 7.5 million đồng fine for social media posts, shares, or comments deemed “distorted” or “false.” [1] Over time, this 7.5 million đồng figure has instilled a widespread and shared sense of fear across the country.

However, beginning July 1, 2026, this anxiety will intensify with the enactment of Decree 174/2026, which governs administrative penalties in postal services, telecommunications, radio frequencies, electronic transactions, and information technology. [2]

Article 95 of this decree states that the act of “providing” or “sharing” false information is punishable by a fine of 20 to 50 million đồng, or approximately $760 to $1,900 USD.

Despite the new financial penalty, the underlying worry remains exactly the same; because the authority to determine what constitutes truth or falsehood lies predominantly with the police, there is growing concern that the increase in fines will be arbitrarily applied to suppress the public.

How Does the Law Determine ‘Truth’?

While the general public often views truth and falsehood as a clear binary, the boundary in legal affairs is significantly more complex. Not all information can be easily categorized as true or false, real or fake.

To determine whether information is legally ‘false,’ one must first establish its nature. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) affirmed this principle in a landmark ruling concerning freedom of expression.

During Lingens v. Austria (1986), the ECHR set an important precedent by distinguishing between verifiable facts and subjective judgments. [3] [4]

The case originated when journalist Peter Michael Lingens wrote articles criticizing Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian Socialist Party chairman, for supporting a former Nazi Party member. Austrian courts convicted Lingens of defamation, fined him, and censored his work because he could not prove his negative assessments were factually true.

Upon appeal, the ECHR ruled that convicting a journalist for political criticism was unnecessary in a democratic society and directly violated the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [5]

The ECHR acknowledged the justice in protecting an individual’s honor and affirmed that politicians are subject to broader limits of criticism than ordinary citizens because they voluntarily accept public scrutiny.

Furthermore, penalizing journalists for political criticism stifles the role of the press in public discourse. In particular, the ECHR emphasized that Lingens’ criticisms were subjective assessments, meaning the Austrian courts were wrong to demand proof of their absolute truth.

United States law approaches this issue from a similar direction.

The First Amendment fundamentally protects the freedom of expression for American citizens. [6] However, the Milkovich v. Lorain Journal case (1990) established that not every statement labeled an “opinion” is automatically immune from defamation or libel claims. [7]

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the evaluation of an opinion depends on whether it contains an objective, verifiable fact. If a statement appears to be an opinion but implies a specific, provably false fact, it remains subject to defamation laws.

Unlike other regions, the U.S. and many European nations do not have a broad system for penalizing individuals simply for making false statements on social media. Instead, they address harmful speech through targeted legal frameworks governing defamation, infringement of honor, incitement to violence, threats, and harassment.

These legal precedents establish a framework for determining the “truth” of information, ensuring that controversial content is not judged by identical standards. For instance, claiming “Mr. A received bribes” is a verifiable fact requiring evidence, whereas stating “Mr. A is a poor manager” is a subjective assessment.

No matter how harsh or controversial, subjective assessments cannot be deemed legally false unless they contain verifiable facts; information is only false if it asserts a non-existent event or contradicts verifiable data.

Strict Conditions for Handling “False” Information

In democratic nations, determining that a statement is false is not enough. Other relevant factors, such as the intent behind the error, the resulting consequences, and the public status of the subject involved must be considered before reaching a legal conclusion.

Without these criteria, “falsehood” becomes an overly broad concept that encompasses various forms of expression. As a result, the line between combatting fake news and restricting freedom of expression becomes blurred.

Under U.S. defamation law, a plaintiff must typically prove four basic elements to win a lawsuit: [8]

A false statement was made regarding an event.
The statement was published or communicated to a third party.
There was a degree of fault, amounting to at least negligence.
The statement caused damage to the honor or reputation of the referenced individual or organization.

The U.S. Supreme Court set even stricter criteria for cases involving public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). [9] Officials cannot win a defamation case simply by proving the information was false. They are required to prove “actual malice,” meaning the speaker either knew the information was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

The purpose of this principle is not to condone fake news, but rather to safeguard the space required for public debate. If a single false detail is sufficient to punish a speaker, both the press and the public will resort to self-censorship when discussing vital social issues.

In Europe, statements that damage an individual’s honor remain subject to the freedom of expression protections outlined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [10]

Establishing the limits of the press is not only a technical legal matter; it is a response to a historical question of freedom. Truth cannot be protected through the suppression of dissenting opinions.

The British philosopher John Stuart Mill addressed this issue when discussing freedom of thought and speech. He argued that individuals can never be absolutely certain that the viewpoint they are attempting to refute is entirely false, because all opinions—whether right or wrong—hold value in the cognitive process of finding the truth. [11]

According to Mill, no entity, not even the state or a democratic majority, has the right to suppress an opinion simply because it is deemed wrong or dangerous. To use power to silence others is to assume that the entity wielding that power possesses an absolute and infallible understanding of the truth.

However, the Vietnamese government appears to disagree.

How to Determine “False Information” in Việt Nam

Since July 1, 2026, penalties for posting content deemed “false” by authorities have increased significantly.

Under Article 95 of Decree 174/2026, “providing or sharing” false information incurs a fine of 20 to 30 million đồng under Clause 1. This penalty rises to 30 to 50 million đồng under Clause 2 if the information is determined to “cause public panic and damage to socio-economic activities…”

Despite these steep new fines, the Vietnamese legal system offers no clear criteria for determining what constitutes “fake” or “false” information, leaving the public in a state of confusion.

To date, the only document attempting to clarify these terms is a drafted Decree on preventing and combating fake news, released for public comment by the Ministry of Public Security in February 2026. [12]

While this draft defines concepts like “fake news” and “false information,” its interpretations remain overly broad. [13] It fails to establish a definitive boundary between verifiable factual claims and subjective opinions, criticisms, or even fictional stories.

As these new fines take effect, the power to dictate what is true and what is fake remains entirely with the police and relevant state agencies.

Historically, the scope of what authorities label “fake news” has been vast, most commonly targeting information that criticizes the Communist Party, the state, and its leadership.

However, the police have also penalized citizens for sharing baseless ghost stories or fabricated social media content designed merely for views, such as videos of rice exploding in the sun or someone riding a python in Hồ Gươm. [14] [15] [16]

A recurring theme in news reports regarding these punishments is the authorities’ reliance on bare, conclusive statements. [17] Officials frequently declare content “false” or “distorted” without specifying what event is being discussed, how the claim is factually incorrect; what evidence disproves it or the actual extent of the resulting damage?

In reality, the majority of penalized content consists of subjective public opinions, which cannot be proven true or false. [18] Yet, this content almost always involves criticism of the government and its leaders or poses a challenge to state policies.

This bias is evident in the drafted Decree on preventing and combating fake news. Drafted by the Ministry of Public Security and reviewed by the Ministry of Justice in early May 2026, the document explicitly classifies fake news that damages the reputation of the Party, the State, or its leaders as “highly harmful.” Conversely, false information that merely affects ordinary citizens is classified as “lowly harmful.” [19] [20]

This classification contrasts with international law, which dictates that state agencies and leaders must be subject to broader public scrutiny. While their reputations warrant protection, we must always balance such considerations against the vital interests of public debate.

Ultimately, the transition from the old 7.5 million đồng fine to the new 50 million đồng penalty primarily changes the financial ruin a citizen can face. The underlying issues—the deliberate ambiguity in defining “false” information and the pervasive anxiety surrounding freedom of speech—remain unresolved.

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 2, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights to the English translation.