A Decade After the South China Sea Ruling: Geopolitics, ASEAN, and International Law 

On July 12, 10 years after the Arbitral Tribunal issued its ruling in the Philippines v. China case (2016–2026), 14 countries released a joint statement rejecting the legal basis for the excessive maritime claims of Beijing in the South China Sea. 

The signatories included Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, the Philippines, Romania, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Union also issued a separate statement reaffirming the 2016 ruling as an important milestone in the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. [1]

This joint statement shows that the 2016 award is increasingly being treated as an international legal benchmark. For years, countries outside the region have issued individual statements, often using carefully calibrated language to defend international law while avoiding a direct confrontation with China. 

This time, however, these 14 nations signed a single document directly affirming that the expansive maritime claims of China, including those based on so-called “historic rights,” have no legal basis. 

They also reiterated that the 2016 ruling is final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines. [2]

However, this diplomatic support has not been enough to change the behavior of China or its advantage on the ground. Furthermore, the absence of most ASEAN countries from the statement demonstrates that the region still lacks a unified position on the ruling.

A Legal Coalition, Not a Military Alliance

Except for the Philippines, the countries participating in the joint statement are not claimants in the South China Sea; they are not primarily defending a specific territorial claim by the Philippines, Việt Nam, or any other Southeast Asian state. Instead, they are defending the interpretation and application of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

In other words, this is a coalition built around legal principles rather than an alliance formed to conduct joint military operations.

The central argument of the statement is clear: UNCLOS serves as the definitive legal framework governing maritime rights and obligations. According to the 2016 ruling, China cannot use the concept of “historic rights” to claim resources beyond the maritime zones to which it is entitled under the Convention. 

Furthermore, the tribunal concluded that no feature in the Spratly Islands is capable of generating a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone under Article 121 of UNCLOS. As a result, many areas Beijing treats as disputed waters are, in fact, within the exclusive economic zones of coastal states, especially the Philippines. [3]

Additionally, the statement by the 14 countries opposed the use of coast guard, military, and maritime militia forces to harass, obstruct, or threaten the lawful activities of other states. It clearly links the 2016 ruling to current events on the ground, specifically calling out the use of water cannons, lasers, blocking maneuvers, collisions, and encirclement of Philippine resupply vessels and fishing boats by China. [4]

Beijing Rejects the Ruling

China’s response remains consistent with the stance it has held since 2016. Its Foreign Ministry dismissed the ruling as illegal, null and void, and nonbinding, going so far as to describe it as “nothing more than a piece of waste paper.” [5] 

Beijing maintains that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, that the proceedings violated international arbitration practice, and that the rights of China as a sovereign state and UNCLOS member were infringed. Furthermore, China insists that it will not accept any third-party dispute settlement mechanism or any solution imposed upon it. [6]

Politically, Beijing views the case as part of a broader strategy driven by the United States and its allies to contain Chinese influence. Chinese state media commentaries frequently frame the ruling as a geopolitical weapon rather than an independent legal process. 

Hence, the fact that the U.S, Japan, and several European nations signed the recent statement does not validate the legitimacy of the ruling for Beijing. Instead, it reinforces China’s assertion that external powers are exploiting and “internationalizing” the South China Sea issue.

This dynamic was evident in the fierce reaction of China toward Japan. Following the joint statement, the Foreign Ministry of China summoned a senior official from the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to officially protest the involvement of Tokyo. Beijing issued a warning that it would respond “resolutely and forcefully” to the provocative actions of Japan, deliberately linking the South China Sea dispute to ongoing tensions over Taiwan. [7]

China does not view the ruling as a simple legal disagreement between Beijing and Manila. Rather, it interprets the reaffirmation of the award as a critical front in a broader competition over the regional order, pitting China against the U.S. and its partners. In this worldview, China believes it alone holds the absolute authority to establish norms, interpret the law of the sea, and dictate the maritime rights of other parties in the South China Sea.

ASEAN Remains Divided

For the Philippines, the joint statement represents a significant diplomatic victory. In the early years following the ruling, the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) deliberately downplayed the case to improve relations with China. However, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (from 2022 to the present), Manila has decisively changed course. 

By publicizing maritime confrontations, expanding defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia, and returning the ruling to the center of its South China Sea policy, Manila has successfully encouraged other nations to use the award as a benchmark for assessing maritime claims. The 14-country joint statement, alongside the separate declaration by the EU, demonstrates that the effort of the Philippines to transform a bilateral ruling into a broader reference point has yielded tangible results.

Despite this success, no ASEAN country aside from the Philippines signed the joint statement. Việt Nam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia all possess direct interests affected by the activities and claims of China in the South China Sea, yet they opted not to participate. 

This abstention does not necessarily signify opposition to the ruling. Việt Nam has previously welcomed the tribunal award and emphasized the role of UNCLOS, while Malaysia and Indonesia have similarly invoked maritime law to reject the incompatible claims of Beijing.

The hesitation stems from the fact that signing a statement led by Western countries carries different political implications than independently affirming a legal stance. While ASEAN members may agree on general principles like restraint and respect for UNCLOS, the bloc struggles to present a unified front when directly confronting Chinese behavior. Because some member states lack maritime disputes and rely heavily on the economic and political support of Beijing, the 2016 ruling has not become a common foundation for ASEAN. 

Consequently, Southeast Asia finds itself in an unfavorable position: crucial regional security norms are increasingly defended by outside powers, while ASEAN itself remains unable to forge a collective stance.

The Gap Between Law and the Reality on the Ground

After 10 years, the arbitral ruling’s legal value has not diminished. By issuing their joint statement, the 14 countries prevent China from turning its rejection of the award into a normalized position tacitly accepted by the international community. 

Each time nations reaffirm the value of the ruling, they further constrain Beijing’s ability to legitimize the “nine-dash line” or its newer iterations. However, although international law is increasingly invoked, the situation on the ground remains shaped primarily by the balance of power, sustained physical presence, and the ability to impose maritime control.

As a result, the statement has a limited direct impact on China’s behavior. Beijing continues to maintain its coast guard, maritime militia, and military facilities on reclaimed features. At Scarborough Shoal, for example, Philippine fishermen report that they are still driven away or restricted from access, although the 2016 ruling formally recognized the area as a traditional fishing ground for fishers from multiple countries. [8]

This gap between law and reality shows that the main problem with the ruling is enforcement. While UNCLOS establishes dispute settlement procedures and creates binding legal obligations, it possesses no standing enforcement force to compel compliance from a major power. Hence, noncompliance mainly incurs diplomatic reputational damage rather than direct sanctions.

Because of this lack of enforcement, it is difficult to prevent China from responding by increasing its maritime presence, expanding patrols, and demonstrating a determination not to yield to outside pressure. Conversely, the Philippines now has greater incentive to rely on its alliance with the United States and other security partners. 

While these parallel processes may strengthen regional deterrence, they also increase the likelihood that future maritime confrontations will be framed within the context of U.S.-China competition.

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Nguyễn Duy Nam wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 16, 2026. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights to the English translation.